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RECENT DECISIONS
Conclusion
While the maze of technical definitions, requirements and standards
tends to conceal the broad purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, a studied reading of its text and cases arising from it,
will reveal that its overall aim is.
to afford the consuming public protection from the unscrupulous who would sacrifice the health and wellbeing of the citizenry in order to capitalize on their gullibility.
As its name discloses, the Act provides for three separate spheres
of regulation, the control of drugs, cosmetics, and food. Supervision
of food production is further divided into prevention of adulteration
and prevention of misbranding. Finally, control over misbranding is
effected by regulating the identity, quality, and quantity as declared
on the labeling. Since the producer of food must either conform to the
standards prescribed, or risk forfeiture of the misbranded article, an
effective supervision is attainable. But the administration of the Act
must be flexible. The current popularity of dietary and similar special
or enriched foods presents a good illustration for the need of flexibility.
To prevent the flooding of an eager market with inferior or perhaps
even dangerous "enriched" foods requires an increased vigilance that
is attainable only through readily adjustable administrative regulation.
The risk of bodily harm to the citizenry demands facile administrative
supervision rather than a system of legislative amendment.
James F. O'Rieley
Edward I. VanTassel
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ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw-FINDINGS OF FACT OF NLRB-ScOPE OF

REVIEW BY COURTS OF APPEALs.-Universal Camera Corp. v. Nation-

al Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S......
, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. *304
(1951). An employee of the Universal Camera Corporation gave testimony in a hearing conducted under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 et seq. (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151
et seq. (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 136 et seq. (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950), for which reason the corporation, according to the NLRB's finding, discharged him. A petition was filed by the
Board to enforce an order requiring the corporation to reinstate the
or on its container or wrapper, or on any two or all of these, as may be necessary
to render such statement likely to be read by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use of such food."

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
employee and to cease and desist from discriminating against employees who file charges or give testimony under the Act. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 179 F. (2d) 749 (2d Cir. 1950),
entered an enforcement order, and the corporation brought certiorari.
The basic issues involved in this case are: (1) whether the court
of appeals is entitled to consider the record as a whole, including conflicting evidence, or is bound to accept the Board's decision as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence without taking into consideration contradictory evidence in the record; and, (2) whether a
report of an examiner rejected by the Board is part of the record
to be reviewed by the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court held that when a decision of the NLRB is
reviewed by the courts, it is the duty of the court to scrutinize the
entire record, taking into consideration conflicting evidence, to ascertain if the order of the Board is supported by substantial evidence.
This case is significant in that it points up the question whether the
courts' power to review an NLRB ruling has been enlarged by the
Taft-Hartley Act over that existing under the Wagner Act, 49 STAT.
449 et seq. (1935), 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 et seq. (1946). Hence, the
determination of this question must rest upon these two Acts as interpreted by the judiciary.
The Wagner Act provided that the Board's decision was conclusive
if supported by evidence. 49 STAT. 454 (1935). The Taft-Hartley
Act provides that "The findings of the Board with respect to questions
of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole shall be conclusive. . .

."

61 STAT. 148 (1947), 29 U. S. C.

§ 160(e) (Supp. 1950). The Supreme Court interpreted the Wagner
Act to mean that the Board's findings were conclusive if supported by
"substantial evidence." NLRB v. Hearst Publications,Inc., 322 U. S.
111, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed. 1170 (1944). In Consolidated Edison
Co. et al. v. NLRB et al., 305 U. S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed.
126 (1938), it was held:
... that the statute [Wagner Act] in providing that "the findings of the
Board as to facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive," means
Substantial evidence is more than
supported by substantial evidence ....
a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Under the Wagner Act, it was consistently held that Congress had
limited the courts in reviewing the Board's decisions to issues of law;
fact finding was within the province of the Board, subject only to the
requirement of substantial evidence. See NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 60 S. Ct. 493, 84 L. Ed. 704 (1940). Congress entrusted the Board, rather than the courts, with the power to
draw inferences from the facts. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,
supra; NLRB v. Link-Belt Company, 311 U. S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 358,
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85 L. Ed. 368 (1941); NLRB v. Falk Corporation,308 U. S. 453, 60
S. Ct. 307, 84 L. Ed. 396 (1940). The courts could not set aside an
inference of fact of the Board although they might have drawn a different inference. NLRB v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
319 U. S. 50, 63 S. Ct. 905, 87 L. Ed. 1250 (1943). The courts were
precluded from weighing the evidence, NLRB v. Nevada Consolidated
Copper Corp., 316 U. S. 105, 62 S. Ct. 960, 86 L Ed. 1305 (1942);
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241,
60 S. Ct. 203, 84 L. Ed. 219 (1939), or the testimony, Washington,
Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 142, 57 S. Ct.
648, 81 L. Ed. 965 (1937).
After the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, there was a divergence
of opinion whether the Act had enlarged the scope of judicial review
of the Board's decisions. When the instant case was before the court
of appeals, it was stated, 179 F. (2d) at 752: "We cannot agree that
our review has been 'broadened'; we hold that no more was done than
to make definite what was already implied." Two other courts previously had held that there was no change, the judges declaring that
they could not weigh the evidence, Eastern Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 176
F. (2d) 131 (4th Cir. 1949), nor provide a hearing. de novo, Victor
Mfg. & Gasket Co. v. NLRB, 174 F. (2d) 867 (7th Cir. 1949); NLRB
v. Austin Co., 165 F. (2d) 592 (7th Cir. 1947). Another court held
that the Act gave the courts more "latitude" on review, but did not
elaborate on the limits of this extension. NLRB v. Caroline Mills, Inc.,
167 F. (2d) 212 (5th Cir. 1948). However, fewer of the Board's
orders have been enforced under the Taft-Hartley Act than under the
Wagner Act. See the interesting statistics collected in Note, Developments in the Law-The Taft-Hartley Act, 64 H.Av. L. R.v. 781
(1951).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his exhaustive opinion in the instant
case, examined the history of the NLRB-the legislative background
as well as the Court's decisions-concerning the scope of judicial review of the Board's findings of facts. He acknowledged that the terminology of the Supreme Court in its previous opinions readily lent
itself to the justifiable belief that the requirements of the Wagner Act
were satisfied if the evidence supporting the Board's conclusions was
substantial when considered by itself. But this, he continued, did not
mean that the Court ever decided this point explicitly.
Although the practice of surveying the record for substantial evidence in support of agency fact-finding, without considering contrary
evidence, was the previous rule, the Taft-Hartley Act read in par
materia with the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946),
5 U. S. C. § 1009(e) (Supp. 1950), has substantially changed the
nature of the reviewing court's power. In the opinion, 71 S. Ct. at
465, it is stated:
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Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred
from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find
that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, *hen viewed in
the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of
evidence opposed to the Board's view.

On the other hand, Congress has not provided for a hearing de novo.
The decisions of the Board are entitled to highest respect because of
the expert qualifications of its members. In the review of findings of
fact, whether within or without its special competence, the courts are
not permitted to disturb conclusions supported by substantial evidence
in the record considered in its entirety.
The second issue presented by this litigation is whether a report
of an administrative trial examiner that is rejected by the Board is to
be reviewed as part of the whole record by the courts of appeals. The
second circuit court decided that it could not discover from the TaftHartley Act nor from the Congressional reports accompanying it exactly what significance the examiner's report was to have. If the court
accepted the rejected report as part of the record, it felt that it would
be treating the Board's rejection as reversible error. This would be
tantamount to according it the force of a master's report, which it
felt it could not do in the absence of a definite Congressional directive. On this reasoning the court refused to consider the report as part
of the record.
The Supreme Court agreed with the second circuit that Congress
did not intend an examiner's report to be of equal force with that of
a master; it also agreed that Congressional intent was not discernible
from the Taft-Hartley Act alone. However, it asserted that the TaftHartley Act must be construed pari materia with the Administrative
Procedure Act, which in a section dealing with initial examinations
and decisions of administrative examiners, declares: "All decisions
(including initial, recommended, or tentative decisions) shall become
part of the record. .... " 60 STAT. 242, 5 U. S. C. § 1007(b) (1946).
An examiner's report, then, is as much a part of the record as the
complaint or the testimony. As the examiner has had the opportunity
to observe the witnesses, he is in an excellent position to weigh their
credibility according to their demeanor at the hearing. Consequently,
the evidence supporting a conclusion of the Board may be significantly
less substantial if it appears that the examiner, who heard and observed the witnesses, arrived at a conclusion different than the Board's.
In the future, the courts of appeals must consider the entire record,
taking into consideration conflicting evidence which detracts from the
evidence supporting the Board's conclusions. Also, the trial examiner's
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reports are to be considered part of the record and afforded " .. . the
relevance that they reasonably command in answering the comprehensive question whether the evidence supporting the Board's order is
substantial." 71 S. Ct. at 469. In the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 71 S. Ct. at 466, the courts must not deem themselves ".
merely the judicial echo of the Board's conclusion."
Arthur J. Callaghan

CITIZENS-RENUNCIATION OP CITIZENsHIP-NcEsSITY op Ammus RENUNCiANDi-McGrath et al. v. Tadayasu Abo et al., 186
F. (2d) 766 (9th Cir. 1951). In the district court two complaints
were filed by some 975 Japanese-Americans who sought a rescission
of the renunciation of their American citizenship. Upon motions for
inclusion of additional plaintiffs, the number was increased to 4,315.
This group was also composed of United States citizens of Japanese
ancestry. During World War II, these plaintiffs were incarcerated by
the War Relocation authorities at Tule Lake concentration camp,
California, in the interests of national security. In the course of their
detention they executed formal statements renouncing their American citizenship according to the provisions of the Nationality Act of
1940, 54 STAT. 1168 (1940), as amended, 58 STAT. 677 (1944), 8
U. S. C. § 801(i) (1946). The action in the lower court was initiated
upon the allegation that the renunciations were procured under duress
and consequently were void. The findings in earlier decisions reveal
that due to the non-interference of the United States authorities,
Tule Lake became internally controlled by a pro-Japanese faction.
Acheson v. Murakami et al., 176 F. (2d) 953 (9th Cir. 1949).
Through intimidation, coercion and physical violence this group dominafed the political activities of all who were interned there, and
induced a majority to seek renunciation of their American citizenship.
In rendering the decrees the lower court held the renunciations
of all 4,315 plaintiffs void ab initio. Realizing, however, that some
of the plaintiffs might have been disloyal in the past, the court granted
a ninety day interlocutory decree to allow sufficient time for the
Government to introduce any substantial evidence which it might
have against particular plaintiffs to show that they had renounced
voluntarily. The United States introduced evidence against certain
plaintiffs which was rejected by the court and judgment was entered
for all the plaintiffs. On appeal the court reversed the judgments
for the plaintiffs challenged by the Government, with the exception
of one group, and remanded the causes.
While the incarceration of Japanese-Americans during World War
II has already had considerable repercussions in the federal courts,
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the instant case gives rise to another perplexing question-must an
actual intent to expatriate oneself exist if there is an overt act of
expatriation?
One of the earliest decisions involving this problem was MacKenzie v. Hare et al., 239 U. S. 299, 36 S. Ct. 106, 60 L. Ed. 297 (1915),
in which the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel California
election officials to register her as a qualified voter. The defendant's
refusal was predicated upon the ground that the plaintiff had married
a British subject-even though she intended to permanently reside
in California-and thereby had lost her nationality. This situation
was governed by the statutory enactment that "any American woman
who marries a foreigner shall take the nationality of her husband."
34 STAT. 1228 (1907). In brushing aside the plaintiff's plea that
there was no intention to expatriate herself, the Court declared, 239
U. S. at 312: "It [plaintiff's marriage] is as voluntary and distinctive as expatriation and its consequence must be considered as
elected." In Savorghan v. United States et al., 338 U. S. 491, 70
S. Ct. 292, 94 L. Ed. 287 (1950), the plaintiff married an Italian
citizen who was serving as Italian vice consul at St. Louis, Missouri.
Before exchanging vows, the plaintiff was informed that she would
have to become an Italian citizen because of the intended groom's
official position. Accordingly, she signed a document in Italian, which
she could not read, renouncing her American citizenship and swearing allegiance to the King of Italy. Although the district court found
as a matter of fact that the prospective bride intended to obtain
Italian citizenship, it held, nevertheless, that she had no intention of
abjuring her American citizenship. To this the Supreme Court replied, 338 U. S. at 500:
There is nothing, -however, in the Act of 1907 that implies a congressional intent that, after an American citizen has performed an overt
act which spells expatriation under the wording of the statute, he, nevertheless, can preserve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing his
intent. . . to have been contrary to the usual legal consequences of such
an act.

Whether the overt act of expatriation is conclusive evidence of
one's intention has produced a diversity of opinion. In one case,
Doreau v. Marshall, 170 F. (2d) 721, 724 (3d Cir. 1948), there is
the admonition that:
...the forsaking of American citizenship, even in a difficult situation,
as a matter of expediency, with attempted excuse of such conduct later
when crass material considerations suggest that course, is not duress ...
[hut] Duress as we see it is a defense to expatriation.

This trend can likewise be deduced from Dubonnet v. Marshall, 80
F. Supp. 905 (D. D. C. 1948), where the court refused to rescind the
plaintiff's renunciation which became effective when she became a
French national during World War II. At that time the plaintiff was
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aiding in the transportation of French and English prisoners of war
from German war camps to Parisian hospitals under the guise of a
French national. When the internal conditions of France became
strained she was advised to apply for French citizenship so that the
French police could render her protection as a Frenchman. Despite
the renunciant's claim that she always considered herself an American citizen, the court maintained that the mere fact that she may
have feared the Gestapo was not sufficient grounds for relief. This
rationale was also applied in Kazdy-Reich v. Marshall, 88 F. Supp.
787 (D.D.C. 1950), where the plaintiff, wife of a Hungarian citizen known for his opposition to the Communists, voted in the Hungarian elections of 1945, and thereby repudiated her American citizenship. See Nationality Act of 1940, § 401(e), supra. Plaintiff contended that she had been listed as a voter and feared that any inaction on her part might have proved detrimental to herself and to
her husband. This, she maintained, was due to the overwhelming
majority of Communists in Hungary. Nevertheless the court held,
88 F. Supp. at 788, ".. . the fact that she went to the polls and voted
against the Communists indicates a free will rather than the contrary." Contra: Schioler v. United States et al., 75 F. Supp. 353 (N.
D. Il. 1948), aff'd, 175 F. (2d) 402 (7th Cir. 1949). While one may
agree that expediency based upon a misdirected motive should not be
grounds for a rescission of one's expatriation, the expediency in the
last two cases discussed does not fall under that category. Obviously,
the courts here have only concerned themselves with the concept of
duress per vigorem (physical), and disregarded duress per minas (mental) which, of course, can have equal effect.
On the other hand, the courts have recognized the disparity between intention and act where the renunciation resulted from American citizens entering the service of foreign armies. Nationality Act of
1940, § 401(c), supra. In Podea v. Acheson, 179 F. (2d) 306 (2d
Cir. 1950), the plaintiff, a United States citizen by birth-though born
of alien parents-was taken to Roumania in his childhood by his
parents. In 1934 the Roumanian authorities called him for military
service but granted him a two-year scholastic deferment. Prior to
1934, the plaintiff had applied for a passport to America from the
American Consulate and at that time took the oath of allegiance to the
United States. When he informed the Consulate of his military registration, they answered with an erroneous ruling that because his father
was registered as a Roumanian, he (plaintiff) had lost his American
citizenship. Rejected again in 1936 by the Consulate, he was inducted
into the Roumanian Army in 1937 for one year, and again in 1941. By
virtue of his marriage to an American, he gained entrance to the United
States in 1942. In settling this litigation, the court held, 179 F. (2d) at
309:
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It seems most technical to hold that the plaintiff did not act under
duress. In our opinion he never voluntarily expatriated himself by taking
an oath of allegiance to Roumania or by serving in the Roumanian army.
Both steps were . . . primarily caused by erroneous advice of the State

Department....
This recognition of involuntary expatriation, despite the performance
of the overt act of renunciation, also was judicially explained in In re
Gogal, 75 F. Supp. 268 (W. D. Pa. 1947). The plaintiff had been taken
to Czechoslovakia as a child, but when he reached military age the
police forcibly delivered him to the military authorities for service.
The court held that since no oath of allegiance had been taken, no
voluntary renunciation resulted. Accord: Dos Reis ex rel. Camara v.
Nicolls, 161 F. (2d) 860 (1st Cir. 1947); Ishikawa v. Acheson, 85 F.
Supp. 1 (D. T. Hawaii), motion for new trial granted, 90 F. Supp. 713
(D. T. Hawaii 1949); United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, 28 F. (2d)
44 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
How then are these "military cases" distinguishable from Dubonnet v. Marshall, supra, and Kazdy-Reich v. Marshall, supra? Apparently the only differentiating factor is the likelihood of physical coercion, duress per minas being entirely disregarded.
In contradistinction to these decisions are two recent cases which
also involved United States citizens of Japanese ancestry. Jurisdiction
by the federal courts was acquired under section 401(e), Nationality
Act of 1940, supra, which states that:
A person who is a national of the United States, whet-her by birth
or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by:
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating
in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory ....

[Emphasis supplied.]

In Hatsuye Ouye v. Acheson, 91 F. Supp. 129 (D. T. Hawaii 1950),
the plaintiff, an American of Hawaiian birth, was taken to Japan
at the age of six. She remained there throughout the war and
was deemed to have expatriated herself when she voted in the 1946
general elections in Japan. She answered the accusation of expatriation by averring that she was under pressure of "social compulsion
of the community" and feared the loss of her rations as well as other
punishment. In addition, she asserted she was influenced and induced
to vote by General MacArthur's Headquarters, and in so doing, she
believed her allegiance to the United States would be recognized. The
sympathetic court in holding for the plaintiff characterized her, 91 F.
Supp. at 130, as ".... a simple young woman... with little knowledge
of political activities. . . .," and decreed, 79 F. Supp. at 131, that,
"the plaintiff's voting was not the result of free and independent
choice. . . . The benefits of citizenship can be renounced . . . only as
the result of free and intelligent choice. . . ." Within the shadow of
this ruling is Kuniyuki v. Acheson, 94 F. Supp. 358 (W. D. Wash.
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1950), where in a meticulous decision, it was determined that even
though the plaintiff had cast her vote in both the 1946 and 1947 elections in Japan, section 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940 did not
apply. The reasoning was that Japan was not a foreign state in the
true sense of the word since it was subject to American control, and
that the elections were not truly political elections, in that all the
candidates had been screened by MacArthur's headquarters. Further,
the court ieasoned that the plaintiff had voted involuntarily for substantially the same reasons as appeared in Hatsuye Ouye v. Acheson,
supra.
From these cases, then, the question to be answered in future litigation would seem to be whether the courts should look beyond the
overt act of expatriation and determine if the renunciant's intention
was to forsake his nationality. While no quarrel exists with the principal case, where duress per vigorem was correctly recognized, the
courts must still establish a consistent rule for those cases where
duress per minas exists.
Thomas Meaney, Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE

TAXATION

OF INTERSTATE SALEs.-Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of

State of Illinois, 340 U. S ..... 71 S. Ct. 377, 95 L. Ed. *329 (1951).
The petitioner, a Massachusetts manufacturer, maintained a branch
office in Illinois. An inventory of goods was kept there for over-thecounter sales. For customers desiring articles not kept in stock at
the branch office, orders were received and forwarded to the main
office to be approved and filled. These orders were shipped either directly to the buyer or through the branch office. Illinois buyers also
placed orders directly with the main office, receiving either direct
shipments or shipments through the branch office in return. The Illinois Department of Revenue subjected the proceeds of all of these
operations to the Illinois Sales Tax, which is computed on the gross
receipts of a ". . . person engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in the State. .

. ...[Emphasis

supplied.] ILL.

REv. STAT. c. 120, § 441 (1949). The petitioner brought certiorari,
contesting a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in favor of the
Department of Revenue.
The Supreme Court, in the principal case, affirmed the decision insofar as it upheld the inclusion as taxable income of the proceeds
from local sales; from sales from orders received by the branch office
although filled directly from the main office; and from sales on direct
order to the main office, but shipped through the branch office. But
the judgment was vacated on the ground that orders sent directly to
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the main office, and shipped directly back to the buyer were interstate in nature and not taxable by Illinois. Justice Reed dissented
in part, arguing that orders sent through the branch office but filled
by direct shipment to the buyer were interstate in nature because title
passed in Massachusetts, and hence not taxable by Illinois. Justices
Clark, Douglas and Black joined in a dissent on the ground that the
magnitude of the branch office's operations was a decisive factor in
inducing direct-order, direct-return sales, and that the taxpayer failed
to meet the burden of proving that those sales were dissociated from
local business. Thus, they were properly taxable by Illinois.
The issue was whether a state jax, to which a foreign seller is subject because it maintains a branch office within the state, is repugnant
to the Commerce Clause if the tax is imposed on the proceeds of all
sales in which the branch office is in any way connected. The Court
found a sufficient incident upon which to impose the tax if either the
order is placed through the branch office or the shipment received
through it.
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States ...
." U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 441-2, 6 L. Ed. 678 (U. S.
1827), Chief Justice Marshall devised the "original package" doctrine,
the first test to be applied in litigation of the repugnancy of a state
tax to interstate commerce:
... when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has
become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the
country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and
-has become subject to the taxing power of the state; but while remaining
the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or
package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on
imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution.

This doctrine was later modified by the interpretation that "imports"
meant goods from another country, and not from another state, and
also that interstate commerce is subject to state taxation so long as
it is non-discriminatory. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. Ed.
(U. S. 1869). The "original package" doctrine, as a principle governing all interstate commerce tax issues, was finally disposed of by
American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365, 48
L. Ed. 538 (1904), which approved taxation of goods still in the
original package after they had reached their destination and were
held for sale in the state.
The next important standard applied by the Court was the "directindirect" test, the gist of which was that a state tax might not directly
burden interstate commerce, but a tax that only indirectly affected the
profits or returns from such commerce was permissible. Cooney et al.
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 294 U. S. 384, 55 S.
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Ct. 477, 79 L. Ed. 934 (1935); Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.
S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358, 79 L. Ed. 838 (1935); Monamotor Oil Co. v.
Johnson et al., 292 U. S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. Ed. 1141 (1934);
DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 47 S. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 524
(1927); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. et al. v. Daughton et al., 262 U. S.
413, 43 S. Ct. 620, 67 L. Ed. 1051 (1922); Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165
(1920); United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 S.
Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed. 1135 (1918); Galveston, H., & S. A. Ry. et al. v.
Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 S. Ct. 638, 52 L. Ed. 1031 (1908). Many
of the decisions during this period were applying the direct-indirect
test while using such terms as non-discriminatory, undue burden, or
excessive burden as substitutes for it. Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton
et al., 262 U. S. 506, 43 S. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095 (1923). Justice
Cardozo attempted to clarify the meaning of these vexatious terms
when he stated: "Nice distinctions have been made at times between
direct and indirect burdens. They are irrevelant when the avowed
purpose of the obstruction . . . is to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states." Baldwin v. Seelig, 294
U. S. 511, 522, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 1032 (1935).
In 1938, a new formula found its expression in the words "multiple
taxation," i.e., a tax is invalid if it places on commerce burdens capable of being imposed with equal right by every state which the
commerce touches. Western Live Stock et al. v. New Mexico Bureau
of Revenue et al., 303 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. Ed. 823 (1938);
accord, Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford et al., 305 U. S.
434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 82 L. Ed. 272 (1939); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storem
et al., 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. Ed. 1365 (1938). Cf.
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 S.
Ct. 388, 84 L. Ed. 565 (1940). The Court was careful in the Adams
case to point out that this "double tax burden" could easily be resolved by an apportionment of the receipts into non-taxable interstate commerce and taxable intrastate commerce, thereby avoiding the
interdiction against a tax levied on gross receipts. The same idea was
expressed in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford et al., supra,
305 U. S. at 441: "For half a century . . . it has not been doubted
that state taxation of local participation in interstate commerce measured by the entire volume of the commerce is likewise foreclosed."
See also Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey et al., 334 U. S.
653, 68 S. Ct. 1260, 92 L. Ed. 1633 (1948); Joseph et al. v. Carter
& Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U. S. 422, 67 S. Ct. 815, 91 L. Ed. 993
(1947).
The Berwind-White decision, supra, 309 U. S. at 49, placed much
emphasis on the "taxable incident"; that is, where the taxable incident occurred in the state of the buyer, it could not be the subject
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of a tax in any other state. ". . . transfer of possession to the purchaser within the state . . . is the taxable event regardless of the time
and place of passing title. . . " This new answer to the problem was
an ostensible attempt to circumvent the old formulas to enable the
state to tax that which was clearly interstate in character. See International Harvester Co. et al. v. Dep't of Treasury et al., 322 U. S.
340, 64 S. Ct. 1019, 88 L. Ed. 1313 (1944); McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co. et al., 322 U. S. 327, 64 S. Ct. 1023, 88 L. Ed. 1304
(1944); McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U. S. 70, 60
S. Ct. 404, 84 L. Ed. 584 (1940).
The Court has shown the tendency, in recent cases, to use the
"multiple taxation" test to the exclusion of all others formerly employed. See Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U. S. 662, 69
S. Ct. 1264, 93 L. Ed. 1613 (1949); Ott et al. v. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. et al., 336 U. S. 169, 69 S. Ct. 432, 93 L. Ed. 585
(1949).
In the present case, the Court allowed taxation of one phase of
the petitioner's transactions which was clearly interstate in character.
No recourse was made to the language of former decisions which
adopted "apportionment," "directness," or other word formulas. Nor
was there mention of a possible multiple tax burden. The holding was
predicated solely on the fact that the presence of the petitioner's local
retail outlet was sufficient to attribute all income derived from Illinois
sales to that outlet. An enterprise ". . . cannot channel business
through a local outlet to gain the advantage of a local business and
also hold the immunities of an interstate business." 71 S. Ct. at 381.
Ostensibly, if it appears that any portion of the taxpayer's business
is intrastate, the "taxable incident" theory will be invoked to uphold
state taxation, of otherwise doubtful validity, of interstate operations
merely incidental to local sales. If this assumption is correct, the
recent decision in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U. S.
---, 71 S. Ct. 508, 95 L. Ed. *435 (1951), where the state tax was
struck down upon a finding that no part of the taxpayer's business
was intrastate, is distinguishable from the principal case.
Richard John Audino

CONTRACTs-REscissioN FOR MISREPRESENTATION-NECESSITY OF
INJuRY.-Earl v. Saks & Co.. .... Cal. (2d) ...., 226 P. (2d) 340
(1951). The donor, relying upon the misrepresentation of the seller
that the price of a fur coat was reduced from $5,000 to $4,000, purchased the coat for a gift. He was unaware of a collusive pact between the seller and donee in accordance with which the donee paid
the amount of the supposed reduction. The donor sought rescission,
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and the California Supreme Court, in granting relief, held that the
donor received something substantially different from that for which
he contracted in that the seller delivered an incomplete gift. The
donor had intended to buy a gift entirely paid for by himself.
The instant case presents two questions of which the first is settled
and the second problematical. First, is injury a pre-requisite for
rescission of contract on grounds of misrepresentation? And secondly,
if so, what is the minimum injury for which a rescission will be
granted?
The "no injury, no rescission" formula bespeaks the general rule,
Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co., 113 Tex. 441, 258 S. W. 462 (1924),
but it admits of distinct exceptions in a body of cases in which the
question of injury is disregarded. In these decisions, the courts acted
under the doctrines of mutual assent and undisclosed principal. If
a party misrepresents his identity, the contract is voidable. Rodliff
et al. v. Dallinger, 141 Mass. 1, 4 N. E. 805 (1886); Vaiden v. Rudolph, 145 N. Y. Supp. 55 (S. Ct. 1913); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1518 (Williston and Thompson ed. 1937). A person contracting
with an agent of an undisclosed principal may rescind if the agent
conceals a principal with whom the person would not have negotiated.
Morrow v. Ursini et al., 96 Conn. 219, 113 Atl. 388 (1921); Cohn v.
Knabb, 105 Wash. 363, 177 Pac. 794 (1919); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 304 (1933). Rescission may be granted where a person represents
himself as an agent when, in fact, he is acting for himself. Fox v.
Tabel, 66 Conn. 397, 34 Adt. 101 (1895).
Rescission may be denied on. the basis of rectification rather than
because of the insufficiency of the injury. Concealment of a lien upon
land was not ground for rescission when the lien was satisfied before
trial. Callaway v. Chrestman, 269 S. W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
Rescission was denied when the principal ratified acts of his agent
that had been beyond the scope of his authority. Billingsley v. Benefield, 87 Ark. 128, 112 S. W. 188 (1908); accord, Jakway v. Proudfit, 76 Neb. 62, 109 N. W. 388 (1906).
Five days after the instant case was decided a district court of
appeals of California denied rescission where the seller had misrepresented the length of a lot by approximately ten feet. It was not proved
to the satisfaction of the court that the buyer was induced to buy
in reliance on the fraud, nor that the misrepresentation was of a fact
so material that an injury could be implied. Bramaric et al. v. Churick, ._ Cal. App. (2d) . 226 P. (2d) 657 (1951). The dividing
line between legally sufficient injuries and legally inadequate injuries
lies somewhere within the narrow span between the principal case
and Bramaric et al. v. Churich, supra. In order to approximate a distinction, the cases must be classified as: (1) transactions where there
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is a misrepresentation of physical characteristics of the subject matter; and (2) transactions where there is a misrepresentation of something incidental or collateral to the subject matter.
In the first group of cases, in which the courts are confronted
with situations in which the buyer receives something physically different from what he expected, e.g., an arid plot of land instead of
an arable one, rescission is granted or denied according to one or the
other of two tests. The strict view was adopted in Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co., supra, where it was held that, in addition to proving
that the misrepresentation affected the subject matter and was relied
upon, pecuniary damage must be shown. Accord, Baker v. Maxwell
et al., 99 Ala. 558, 14 So. 468 (1893); Sieveking et al. v. Litzler,
31 Ind. 13 (1869); Lakeside Forge Co. v. Freedom Oil Works Co.,
265 Pa. 528, 109 AtI. 216 (1920). The other test, which is nonpecuniary, necessitates the showing of a material lack of compliance
with the expected performance. Having been shown this, the court
will imply an injury. Sheridan Oil Corporation et al. v. Davidson,
75 Colo. 584, 227 Pac. 553 (1924); Magnuson et al. v. Bouck et al.,
178 Minn. 238, 226 N. W. 702 (1929); Pennington v. Roberg, 122
Minn. 295, 142 N. W. 710 (1913); Nelson v. Carlson, 54 Minn. 90,
55 N. W. 821 (1893); Larsen et al. v. Lootens et al., 102 Ore. 579,
203 Pac. 621 (1922).
Within the second classification are situations in which the buyer
obtains subject matter substantially identical with his expectations,
but where there is misrepresentation as to other matters involved in
the transaction. The principal case is of this group since the vendee
received the fur coat, the exact thing contracted for, but was misled
as to other matters touching the transaction.
In the cases granting rescission for misrepresentation of a collateral matter, a test of injury emerges: would the purchase have
been made, had not the fraud been practiced? If not, the fraud is
material to the transaction and a legal injury is implied. A buyer
was able to rescind where the seller induced him to purchase what
was said by the seller to be one of two remaining lots left on a city
block. In truth it was one of two lots sold. The Delaware court held
that ". . . . the incurring of pecuniary obligations as a result of
fraudulent representations is in itself an injury . . ." without proving
other money damages. Webster v. Palm Beach Ocean Realty Co.,
16 Del. Ch. 15, 139 Atl. 457, 459 (1927). In another case, sufficient
injury was done when the seller represented that the law books purchased were the only ones of their kind in the vicinity when, in fact
they were not. Edward Thompson Co. v. Schroeder, 131 Minn. 125,
154 N. W. 792 (L915). On the other hand, where a subscription to
corporate stock was induced by misrepresentations that a named person, in whose judgment the proposed subscriber had special con-
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fidence, desired and advised the subscription and would himself be
personally connected with the business, the court held that mere
reliance on the representations was sufficient injury to justify rescission. Vulcan Fire Ins. Co. v. Jorgensen, 33 Cal. App. 763, 166
Pac. 835 (1917). See also Fuhrman v. American Nat. Building &
Loan Ass'n et al., 126 Cal. App. 202, 14 P. (2d) 601 (1932); Farrell
v. Miramar Hotel Co. et at., 125 Cal. App. 623, 13 P. (2d) 945
(1932); Brett et al. v. Cooney et al., 75 Conn. 338, 53 Adt. 729
(1902); Higbee v. Trumbauer, 112 Iowa 74, 83 N. W. 812 (1900);
Fawkes v. Knapp, 138 Minn. 384, 165 N. W. 236 (1917); Meinershagen v. Taylor et al., 169 Mo. App. 12, 154 S. W. 886 (1913); Stillwell v. Rankin, 55 Mont. 130, 174 Pac. 186 (1918); Jahn v. Reynolds
et al., 155 App. Div. 647, 101 N. Y. Supp. 293 (2d Dep't 1906);
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Webb, 181 S. W. 853 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1915).
The cases denying rescission tend to show what the minimum
injury is not, rather than what it is. A seller contracted to deliver
225 white-faced lambs from the next year's herd. Not having enough
to fill the order, he bought some of like quality and breed to fulfill
the contract. The buyer's suit for rescission was denied because there
was substantial performance, both legally and physically. Mason v.
Madson, 90 Mont. 489, 4 P. (2d) 475 (1931). Where the buyer
bought a one-tenth interest in a patent relying on the seller's representation that certain persons were buying the remaining portions,
but those interests were sold instead to other persons of equal prominence, the court denied rescission on the ground that it was a mere
moral wrong unaccompanied by injury. Bomar v. Rosser, 131 Ala.
215, 31 So. 430 (1901). Rescission is denied unless the seller's misrepresentations are an operative factor inducing the buyer to change
his position. Miller v. Williamson, 128 Wash. 124, 222 Pac. 201
(1924). Speculative, conjectural, or contingent damages are not sufficient. Darrow v. Houlihan et al., 205 Cal. 771, 272 Pac. 1049
(1928); Wolcott v. Wise, 75 Ind. App. 301, 130 N. E. 544 (1921);
Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. of Oklahoma et al. v. Ferguson, 131
S. W. 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
The rule to be drawn from the cases seems to be that when the
misrepresentation relates to the subject matter, rescission will not be
granted for a mere abstract or moral injury. When the misrepresentation relates to some collateral matter, rescission will depend upofn
whether the buyer would have entered into the transaction but for
the seller's statement. In the principal case, the court might well
have said that since the transaction would not have been entered into
had the buyer known the true state of facts, a legal injury would be
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implied upon which to grant the rescission. This is eminently more
logical than to say that one who bargains to fully pay for a coat,
but is charged for only part of the price, has received something
substantially different.
Richard R. Murphy

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S RIGHT TO
RECOVER FOR PERSONAL INJURIES INDEPENDENT OF HUSBAND'S RIGHT
OF ACTION FOR LOSS OF SERVICES.-McGilvray v. Powell 700 North,

Inc., 186 F. (2d) 909 (7th Cir. 1951). A plate glass window was
blown out of the front of defendant's store, striking the plaintiff. As a
result, she incurred personaLinjuries for which she brought an action
for damages. The plaintiff's husband joined in the action, seeking
damages for loss of his wife's services. The verdicts rendered were
in favor of the wife and against the husband; the defendant appealed
on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent and should be set
iside.
The court held that since the cause of action of a married woman
for personal injuries is independent of her husband's cause of action
for loss of her services, irrespective of whether the actions were joined
or brought separately, the verdicts rendered were not inconsistent.
Modern statutes permit a married woman to sue in her own name
in a tort action; at the same time, by the weight of authority, the
husband retains his common law right of action for the loss of his
wife's services. Lansburgh & Bro., Inc. v. Clark, 127 F. (2d) 331
(D. C. Cir. 1942); Mattfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 32 N. W.
(2d) 291 (1948); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N. D. 418, 28 N. W. (2d) 530
(1947).
The court pointed out that a married woman's right to recover
damages for personal injuries and her husband's right to recover
damages for the loss of her services are separate, distinct, and independent causes of action though stemming from the same injury.
Lansburgh & Bro., Inc. v. Clark, supra; Indianapolis & M. Rapid
Transit Co. v. Reeder, 42 Ind. App. 520, 85 N. E. 1042 (1908);
Duffee v. Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 563, 77 N. E. 1036 (1906);
Mattfeld v. Nester, supra; Blanford v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,
199 S. W. (2d) 887 (Mo. App., St. Louis 1947); Poulos v. Coast
Cities Coaches, Inc., 16 N. J. Misc. 156, 198 Atl. 372 (Dist. Ct.
1937); Milde v. Leigh, supra; Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., 132 Ohio St.
125, 5 N. E. (2d) 324 (1936); Fulcomer v. Pennsylvania R. R., 141
Pa. Super. 264, 14 A. (2d) 593 (1940); Priesterv. Southern Ry. et al.,
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151 S.C. 433, 149 S.E. 226 (1929); Gilman v. Gilman, 115 Vt. 49,
51 A. (2d) 46 (1947); Selleck v. Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 80 N. W.
944 (1899).
Secondly, a judgment for or against one of them is no bar to a subsequent action by the other. Lansbargh & Bro., Inc. v. Clark, supra;
Blakewood v. Yellow Cab Co. et al., 61 Ga. App. 149, 6 S. E. (2d)
126 (1939); Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co. v. Reeder, supra;
Louisville & N. R. R. v. Kinman, 182 Ky. 597, 206 S.W. 880 (1918);
Erickson v. Buckley, 230 Mass. 467, 120 N. E. 126 (1918); Biczan v.
Weil et al., 137 Misc. 517, 243 N. Y. Supp. 740 (S.Ct. 1930); Milde
v. Leigh, supra; Kraut v. Cleveland Ry., supra; Walker v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 168, 45 At. 657 (1900); .Brierly v. Union R. R., 26
R. I. 119, 58 AUt. 451 (1904); Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
et al., 196 S. C. 230, 13 S. E. (2d) 1 (1940); Gilman v. Gilman,
supra. In other words, the disposition of the wife's claim does not
affect the husband's action, since a judgment for or against the wife
is not conclusive as to the husband.
The reasons given for the majority view are well founded. The
causes of action and the parties to the actions are not the same, nor'
is there privity between the husband and wife in asserting their respective demands. The husband could not institute or control an
action in behalf of his wife .since the right is vested solely in her.
Moreover, the wife's judgment is her separate and exclusive property.
When the husband seeks damages for loss of his wife's services,
he sues in his own right, his wife having no right to release or control his claim; and since the husband is neither a necessary nor a
proper party to his wife's suit, he cannot recover his damages in her
individual suit. Laskowski v. People's Ice Co., 203 Mich. 186, 168
N. W. 940 (1918); Womach v. City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100
S. W. 443 (1907). Procedurally, since a husband has no opportunity
to defend or appeal the decision of his wife's action, he is not bound
by the disposition of it. The natural conclusion to be drawn from
the cases is, therefore, that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply.
The minority view, on the other hand, holds that the husband's
damages are consequential, and that since an action for consequential
damages stands no better than its principal case, where the principal
falls, the consequential falls. Hinckley v. Capital Motor Transp. Co.,
321 Mass. 174, 72 N. E. (2d) 419 (1947). Thus where the wife is
not entitled to recover for personal injuries, her inability precludes
her husband's right to recover for the loss of her services. Shaw v.
Boston American League Baseball Co., ....
Mass .....
, 90 N. E. (2d)
840 (1950); Folley v. United Building & Loan Ass'n of Hackensack,
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13 N. J. Misc. 293, 178 Atl. 95 (S. Ct. 1935); Stuart v. Winnie et al.,
217 Wis. 298, 258 N. W. 611 (1935).
This theory is exemplified in cases holding that if the wife is contributorily negligent, her negligence is imputed to her husband so as
to bar his recovery. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Honey, 63 Fed. 39
(8th Cir. 1894); Friedman et al. v. Beck et al., 250 App. Div. 87,
293 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dep't 1937); Callies v. Reliance Laundry
Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N. W. 198 (1925).
Divergence of opinion within the same jurisdiction is not lacking
on this question of law. For instance, there is a patent conflict between two New York cases. In Biczan v. Wel et al., supra, the Supreme Court of New York, Trial Term, held that because there was
no identity of parties, the actions were separate. On the other hand,
the Appellate Division, in Maxson v. Tomek et al., 244 App. Div.
604, 280 N. Y. Supp. 319 (4th Dep't 1935), held that any right the
husband had was necessarily derived from the right of the wife.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin originally held that the husband's
cause of action was not one which initially belongs to the wife and
then is transferred to the husband. Selleck v. Janesville, supra. Yet,
in Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., supra, the same court later held
that the law assigned to the husband a part of the wife's cause of
action, and that being an assignee, the husband took his claim subject
to any defenses valid against the assignor, his wife. Thus, the contention that the actions of the husband and wife are separate and
distinct was denied.
In Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or
Child in an Action for Loss of Services, etc., 2 U. oF Cm-i. L. REv.
173 (1935), the Callies case was analyzed in detail with the author
concluding that the result reached by the Wisconsin court was manufactured, the court having made up its mind as to how to decide the
case, and then rationalized to its decision.
The principal case stands with the weight of authority. The rule
expressed by the court is based on logic and reason, particularly in
view of modern societal conditions where a husband and wife have
a far greater individuality than they did centuries ago. The actions
brought by each are for distinct injuries, and merely because permissible joinder of the causes is allowed, a verdict in favor of one
should not be set aside on the grounds of inconsistency because the
defendant was not found liable to the other. To allow the verdict to be
so set aside would only result in eliminating joinder. If the husband
and wife brought independent suits, inconsistent verdicts could not
be set aside unless the court ruled that the first judgment obtained
was controlling. This would amount to declaring that the first was
res judicata, a declaration which few, if any, courts would make.
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Finally, it must be realized that the defendant has only appealed
the verdict that went against him. As suggested by the court in
Lansburgh & Bro., Inc. v. Clark, supra, 127 F. (2d) at 333, there is
no reason for setting the appealed verdici aside because there is no
showing that it was the incorrect one.
Robert L. Berry

FEDERAL

STATUTES-ANTI-AsSIGNMENT

STATUTE-VALIDITY

OF

VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.-

United States v. Shannon et al., 186 F. (2d) 430 (4th Cir. 1951).
The United States leased from a Mrs. Boshamer and others a tract
of land, remaining in possession under the lease from 1943 to 1947.
In 1946, Mrs. Boshamer, together with the other owners, executed
a deed of the land to the appellees, subject to the lease then existing
in favor of the United States, which purported to transfer to the
vendees any claim of the vendors upon the United States for damages to the land and the adjoining buildings. The three parties-the
United States through its agents, the vendors, and the vendees-then
entered into a written agreement which, among other things, contained a release of the United States from any damage claims by the
vendors, and an assignment of these claims to the vendees. At the
termination of the lease in 1947, the agents of the United States
obtained another release of all damage claims from the vendors. Not
until this second release did the Government raise any question as
to the validity of the assignment.
In this suit brought by the vendees, the court held, with one judge
dissenting, that the assignee of a voluntarily assigned claim against
the United States can assert that claim in an action against the
United States despite the positive bar of the Federal Anti-Assignment
Statute, REv. STAT. § 3477 (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 203 (1946), where
justice demands and the purposes for which the statute was enacted
do not forbid. Though paying lip-service to the Anti-Assignment Act,
and even stating that the instant assignment fell within its terms,
the court circumvented the statute, and allowed a claim which had
been voluntarily assigned to be asserted by the assignee against the
United States.
The court declared, 186 F. (2d) at 434, that the assignee had no
right to sue in law, but that the relief granted was entirely equitable,
establishing no precedent that might lead to the evils that the statute
was designed to prevent. The facts which the court found compositely
material to demand equitable relief were that: (1) it was a fair
assumption that the agents of the Government allowed the parties
to act under a mistake of law that the assignment was valid; (2) the
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parties had acted in good faith; (3) all the interested parties were
before the court, and would be bound; and (4) the Government
could assert any defenses or counterclaims that it ever had or would
have. In short, recovery did not violate the purpose for which the
Act was designed-that the Government be compelled to choose between adverse claimants and be subjected to multiple suits. Moreover, there was an element of fault upon the Government in allowing
the present situation to arise. Throughout the case the court referred
to the basic equitable grounds for relief of undue hardship and unconscionable acts.
The purpose of the statute, as evidenced by its title, is "...
to
prevent Frauds upon the Treasury of the United States." 10 STAT.
170 (1853). The language of the Act is all-inclusive. It declares null
and void all assignments of claims against the United States unless
properly witnessed and made after the allowance of the claim by the
United States and the issuing of a warrant for the sum determined
to be due.
The early interpretation given by the courts paralleled in strictness the language of the Act itself. It was held that the assignee of
a claim against the United States acquired no interest whatsoever by
reason of the assignment, either against the United States, United
States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 407, 24 L. Ed. 503 (1877), or against the
assignor, Spofford v. Kirk et al., 97 U. S. 484, 24 L. Ed. 1032 (1878).
The Court in the Spofford case stated, 24 L. Ed. at 1034, that the
statute " .

. .

. strikes at every derivative interest, in whatever form

acquired, and incapacitates every claimant upon the Government for
creating an interest in the claim in any other than himself."
But this literal view did not long prevail. An exception to the
effect that an assignee of a claim against the Government whose right
came to him by operation of law, as distinguished from the voluntary
act of the parties, could assert the claim against the United States,
was made by the same justices who had decided the Spofford case.
Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392, 24 L. Ed. 1065 (1878). The
particular point decided was that the original owner of the claim,
who had gone through bankruptcy proceedings, could no longer enforce the claim against the United States, since title to it had passed
by operation of law to the assignee in bankruptcy.
Subsequent cases have developed other exceptions embracing assignments by operation of law. Assignments of a claim against the United
States by court order, Western Pacific R. R. v. United States, 268
U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 503, 69 L. Ed. 951 (1925); Price et al. v. Forrest et al., 173 U. S. 410, 19 S. Ct. 434, 43 L. Ed. 749 (1899);
Sherwood v. United States, 112 F. (2d) 587 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on
other grounds, 312 U. S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 767, 85 L. Ed. 1058 (1941);
by a merger of corporations according to state law, Seaboard Airline
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Ry. v. United States, 256 U. S. 655, 41 S. Ct. 611, 65 L. Ed. 1149
(1921); by subrogation, United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 338 U. S. 366, 70 S. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949); United
States v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 171 F. (2d)
893 (4th Cir. 1948); Amherst et al. v. United States, 77 F. Supp, 80
(W. D. N. Y. 1948); by the nationalization of the corporate owner
of the claim, Ozanic v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 4 (S. D. N. Y.
1949); and by a discontinued corporation to its sole stockholder,
Roomberg'v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 621 (E. D. Pa. 1941), have
all been held to be assignments by operation of law not barred by the
Anti-Assignment Statute.
An exception to the sweeping terms of the Statute also has been
made where the litigation concerns only the parties to the voluntary
assignment and not the United States. It is now held that the assignee by way of voluntary assignment can assert his claim against
the assignor, California Bank v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 129 F. (2d) 751 (9th Cir. 1942); In re Pottasch Bros. Co., 79
F. (2d) 613 (2d Cir. 1935); against the administrator of the assignor,
Nutt et al. v. Knut et al., 200 U. S. 12, 26 S. Ct. 216, 50 L. Ed. 348
(1906); Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 26 L. Ed. 229 (1881);
against a subsequent assignee, Martin v. National Surety Co. et al.,
300 U. S. 588, 57 S. Ct. 531, 81 L. Ed. 822 (1937); and against the
trustee in bankruptcy of the assignor, In re Webber Motor Co., 52
F. Supp. 742 (D. N. J. 1943). Contra, as to last named case: National Bank of Commerce of Seattle v. Downie et al., 218 U. S. 345,
31 S. Ct. 89, 54 L. Ed. 1065 (1910); Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v.
First National Bank of Huntingdon, Pa. et al., 185 Fed. 373, aff'd on
reargument, 193 Fed. 52 (3rd Cir. 1911).
Voluntary assignments, however, have consistently been held to
transfer no interest to the assignee for purposes of suit against the
United States, Hager v. Swayne, 149 U. S. 242, 13 S. Ct. 841, 37
L. Ed. 719 (1893), even where the court admitted the injustice of
denying recovery, Emmons v. United States, 189 Fed. 414 (C. C. D.
Ore. 1911). This is the rule which the present case purports to follow
but actually circumvents.
To understand the holding of the court in the principal case, an
examination of the prime purpose of the statute would not be bootless. The Anti-Assignment Statute in no way ties the hands of the
Government. It is left free to utilize the protection afforded by the
statute, or to disregard it and give effect to the voluntary assignment.
The effect of a waiver of the statute by the United States is that the
Government is bound by its action, and sums paid to the assignee of
the voluntarily assigned claim cannot be recovered on the ground
that the assignment was illegal. The waiver of the statute is final.
McKnight et at. v. United States, 98 U. S. 179, 25 L. Ed. 115 (1879);
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Bank of California, National Ass'n, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 133 F. (2d) 428 (9th Cir. 1943).
The cases developing the various exceptions echo the basic purpose of the statute-to protect the Government only and to give no
aid to the parties to the assignment. Western Pacific R. R. v. United
States, supra;Price et al. v. Forrest et al., supra. Therefore, since assignments by operation of law ard not inconsistent with the purpose of
the statute, they are not prohibited by it. United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra.
Generally, exceptions to the Act are made only where the evils
which the statute forbids are not present. The prime evil is the subjection of the Government to conflicting claims by various disputants.
Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 48 S. Ct.
194, 72 L. Ed. 303 (1928). And this evil may be absent from cases
involving voluntary assignments as well as from those in which assignments by operation of law are in issue.
The principal case represents the culmination of the judicial development of exceptions to the Anti-Assignment Statute. The court,
though recognizing the force of the statute, has sanctioned a means
to effectively avoid it in a case where, by reason of the peculiar circumstances, the attainment of justice demands a recovery. The purpose of the statute-the protection of the Government from conflicting claims-is fully achieved inasmuch as all parties are before the
court and are bound by its decision. There remains, then, no valid
reason for denying recovery. If assignments by operation of law are
excepted under the reasoning that the purpose of the statute is still
attained, there is nothing logically to prevent the inclusion of voluntary assignments within the exception where the purpose of the statute
is not thwarted.
Joseph F. MacKrell

LABOR LAW-CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS
-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

THE WISCONSIN

PUBLIC

UTILITY

ANTI-

STIx LAw.--Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Mo-

tor Coach Employees of America et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U. S...... , 71 S. Ct. 359, 95 L. Ed. *383 (1951).
The Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law, WIs. STAT. §§' 111.50-65
(1949), required compulsory arbitration in public utility labor disputes when collective bargaining reached an impasse. To effectuate
the settlement procedure, in the interest of the public, strikes were made
unlawful. Petitioner unions represented the employees of the Milwaukee gas and transit companies. When proposed strikes by these unions
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threatened to cause an interruption of essential utility services, the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board invoked the provisions of this
Act, and all strike activities were enjoined; upon appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the constitutional challenge of the statute by the
unions failed. On review of the important questions presented, Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court of
the United States, declared the Wisconsin Act invalid because it denied petitioners the federally-guaranteed right to strike peacefully for
higher wages. The Wisconsin Act was found to be in direct conflict
with the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 136 et seq.
(1947), 29 U. S. C. §§ 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950), specifically Section 7
of the Act. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Burton and Minton, dissented contending that there was no clear manifestation that
Congress intended to deny the states this exercise of their police power,
nor that the Wisconsin statute necessarily conflicted with tie federal
legislation.
The ruling of the instant case dispels some of the uncertainties surrounding previous extensions of federal labor regulation into spheres
formerly controlled by the states. See Cox and Seidman, Federalism
and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211 (1950). It also raises
contentious questions of policy. See Williams, The Compulsory Settlement of Contract of Negotiation Labor Disputes, 27 TExAs L. Rxv.
587 (1949). But, in addition to broader considerations of policy implicit in this decision, there is the basic question of whether, in view
of the unique circumstances, this is a proper extension of federal authority which actually carries into effect the national labor policy.
Federal jurisdiction over local public utilities is undisputed. These
companies supply essential utility services to industries directly engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. Consolidated Edison Co. et.
al. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938);
Local Transit Lines, 2 CCH LAB. LAW Rn P. (4th ed.) j 10,334 (1950).
But cf. State ex rel. Moore et al. v. Julian et al., 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.
W. (2d) 720 (1949). At the same time, until the passage of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, the states were allowed to define
and prohibit unfair union activities such as picketing, striking, or whatever form the activity might take. This was obviously consistent with
the principles of federal-state relationship which allow the states to meet
local problems according to local ideals-the traditional system. There
is nothing appearing in the 1947 Act to disrupt this ideal. In fact in
section 10(a) of the Act, an effort was made to clarify the federal-state
jurisdictional dilemma by a proviso for the cession of jurisdiction to
state labor boards where the enterprise is of doubtful interstate character, and where the state law is not inconsistent with federal regulation.
Parallel to this reasoning is another tack which takes account of the
fact that the 1947 Act expressly provides in sections 206-10 methods for
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handling strikes that are declared to create national emergencies. 61
STAT. 155-6 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §§ 176-81 (Supp. 1950). SEN. REP.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947). Are not the states to be
similarly allowed to meet local emergencies, such as a utility strike certainly can be? It was to meet local emergencies that the Wisconsin
statute and legislation of other states were enacted. See FLA. STAT.
§§ 453.01 et seq. (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2401 et seq. (Burns
Supp. 1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. -§§ 44-601 et seq. (1949) (seizure
of public utilities by State Labor Commissioner); MAss. ANN. LAWS c.
150 B, §§ 1 et seq. (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.454(1) et seq.
(Henderson 1950); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 295.010 et seq. (1949)
(seizure by governor); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44.801 et seq. (Supp. 1947)
(court of industrial relations; utility workers considered government employees); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13B-1 et seq. (Supp. 1950); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 213 (Supp. 1950) (compulsory arbitration); TEx.
STAT., R:Ev. Civ. art. 1446a (1948); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40 et seq.
(1948).
While judicial construction of these statutes is sparse, repercussions
from the few decisions have resulted in several amendments and supplementary legislation. The New Jersey court found that the lack of
definite standards to guide the arbitration board invalidated the entire
act. State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation of New Jersey
et al., 2 N. J. 335, 66 A. (2d) 616 (1949). An attempt to confer nonjudicial duties upon a circuit judge by appointing him chairman of
the arbitration board was a fatal defect in the original Michigan act.
Transport Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., et al. v. Gadola et al.,
322 Mich. 332, 34 N. W. (2d) 71 (1948). These cases reveal the general condition of flux in labor law and the role of the states in legislative experimentation. See Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation of
New Jersey et al. v. Driscoll et al., 72 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. N.J.
1947).
When faced with the constitutional question of conflicting federal
and state policy, the state courts have consistently held that compulsory arbitration of disputes involving utilities is an integral part of the
state police power. Emphasis in the cases is on the dominant rights
of the public, with most of the constitutional analysis being devoted
to these broader considerations rather than the precise question presented in the principal case. The Michigan court discussed state compulsory arbitration in utility cases but reserved decision on this point
in Transport Workers Union of America, C. 1. 0., et al. v. Gadola et al.,
supra, 34 N. W. (2d) at 75-6. It was held to be part of the police
power in State v. Traffic Telephone Workers' Federation of New Jersey et al., supra 66 A. (2d) at 624-5. The same conclusion was reached when a public utility company challenged the statute on this ground.
New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers of America et al.,
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.... N. J ..... 75 A. (2d) 721 (1950). On March 19, 1951, the Attorney
General of Missouri concluded that the Missouri act was unconstitutional, his opinion being based on the rule in the instant case. 4 CCH LAB.
LAW REP. (4th ed.) f[ 49,142 (1951).
The view taken by the state courts on federal-state conflict seems
to be reiterated, perhaps with greater intrinsic force of argument, by the
dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S.
538, 547, 65 S. Ct. 1373, 89 L. Ed. 1782 (1945). There, Florida's attempt to impede collective bargaining and to require unions operating
within the state to register, was found to conflict directly with the free
exercise of the established federal right of collective bargaining. The
dissenting opinion emphatically made clear that the result of the case
was a limitation on the state's exercise of its reserved powers. However,
since the Hill case, despite dissenting opinions, the Court has gradually
extended the doctrine of federal supremacy in labor relations regulation. When Congress has undertaken regulation in a particular area,
states are precluded from doing so, and in the absence of express guides
to construction of the federal law, exclusion of state action may be implied from the nature of the legislation. Bethlehem Steel Co. et al. v.
New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 S. Ct. 1026,
91 L. Ed. 1234 (1947). This principle was reaffirmed in La Crosse
Telephone Corporationv. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U. S. 18, 69 S. Ct. 379, 93 L. Ed. 463 (1949). These two decisions
were authority for a per curiam reversal of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board et al., 338 U. S. 953, 70 S. Ct. 491, 94 L.Ed. 588 (1950). In
International Union of United Automobile, etc. Workers of America,
C. I. 0., et al. v. O'Brien et al., 339 U. S. 454, 70 S. Ct. 781, 94 L. Ed.
978 (1950), the Court again asserted that where Congress has protected union activity, conflicting state regulation must yield. There
the Court struck down a Michigan statute which attempted to condition the right to strike upon a majority vote of the interested workers
employed in Michigan, and which also provided for a different waiting
period before striking than did the federal Act.
Where Congress has not protected the union activity or otherwise
asserted regulation, states may properly act. International Union,
United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U. S. 245, 69 S. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949) (intermittent unannounced work stoppage); Allen-Bradley Local v. *Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 62 S. Ct. 820, 86 L. Ed. 11-54
(1942) (mass picketing, threats and violence). Viewed in the light
of the foregoing decisions, the conclusion in the instant case serves as
forceful clarification of the judicial attitude in this perplexing field.
See Cox and Seidman, supra.
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The rationale of any extension of federal authority is the desire to
preserve congressional intent-frequently an obscure element. As a
national labor policy, compulsory arbitration was considered unsatisfactory. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947); 93 CONG.
REc. 3835 (1947). When Congress discarded compulsory arbitration
and extended federal regulation upon all industries affecting interstate
commerce, it may have contradicted the thesis of protecting public interests in emergency disputes. There appears to be a lapse of this principle at the local emergency level, although it is possible that Congress
intended control of national emergencies as the only proper limitation on
free collective bargaining. Section 10(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, of 1947, 61 STAT. 146 (1947) 29 U. S. C. § 160(a) (Supp.
1950), providing for state control where there is no inconsistency with
federal law, suggests that Congress is directing a trend towards national
uniformity. However, Rep. Hartley in a comment on this problem, 93
CONG. Rxc. 6383 (1947),

stated that his ".

.

. interpretation of the

bill, [is] that [it] will not interfere with the State of Wisconsin in the
administration of its own laws." Bills introduced at the recent session
of Congress indicate that Congress is still deliberating the issues involved in protecting public interests in utility strikes. See H. R. 2485,
82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H. R. 2486, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1951).
The Court has reiterated its conclusion that Congress meant to exercise exclusive authority in the field of labor relations, insofar as it
has spoken in the Labor-Management Relations Act. One of the rights
definitively protected by the federal legislation is the right to strike,
which will be upheld in all cases where the Court believes the object
of the strike is not unlawful. just what it will allow the states to declare unlawful is still unknown. To turn for the moment to the related activity of picketing, one sees that the Court has allowed the
states to declare picketing unlawful when it violates either statutes
or judicially declared policies of the state. Giboney et al. v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S.490, 69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1949)
(picketing in violation of the state antitrust statute); Building Service
Employees International Union, Local 262 et al. v. Gazzam, 339 U. S.
532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950) (picketing to force an employer to interfere with the employees' choice of a bargaining representative); Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of California, 339 U. S.460,
70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950) (picketing to force an employer
to hire employees according to race in violation of a state policy
against any consideration of race in employment practices); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local 309 et al. v. Hanke et
al., 339 U. S.470, 70 S.Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950) (picketing to
force a union shop upon a self-employer).
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But as yet, the Court has seldom, if ever, allowed any state declared
unlawfulness to invade the statutory right to strike. This appears to
place the statutory right to strike on a higher plane than the constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech-at least in respect to the exercise of the police power by the states. This suggests that a reexamination of the federal-state sphere is in order, so that a state can meet local
emergencies-for example, public utility strikes---just as the TaftHartley Act allows the Federal Government to protect itself by the
national emergency provisions. There appears to be nothing inherently conflicting in the supervision by a state of the labor relations
of its public utilities and the regulation of the commerce by the Federal Government.
William J. Hurley

LABOR LAW-PICKETING-SUFFICIENCY OF "UNLAWFUL OBJECTIvE" To PERMIT INJUNCTION.-Self et al. v. TaylorArk. .....
, 235

S. W. (2d) 45 (1950). Appellant, business agent of a union of electrical workers, offered the respondent, an employer, a contract containing a provision for cancellation by either party upon sixty days'
notice. The contracts previously in force had been for periods of
a year or more. The union's constitution forbade its members from
working with non-union men. The employer, who had in his hire
several non-union men, refused to sign the contract when told that
the union would exercise its right to cancel if he did not discharge
them. The union then began picketing the employer's place of business whereupon he instituted suit for an injunction. The court granted
the injunction on the ground that if the employer signed the contract
he would be violating AiK. CONST. AMEND. XXXIV, § 1, which made
it unlawful to enter into a contract to exclude from employment persons who refuse to join a labor union. On appeal the supreme court
in the instant case held that the injunction was properly granted,
since otherwise the employer would be forced to grant a closed shop
or be subjected to endless picketing.
The question raised by this case was whether the state could properly enjoin peaceful picketing where the object was to force the employer to accept a contract which would in effect establish an illegal
closed shop.
It is the general rule that states cannot enjoin peaceful picketing
when it is for a lawful purpose, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.88,
60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940); Local No. 802 et al. v. Asimos
et al., 216 Ark. 694, 227 S.W. (2d) 154 (1950), since an injunction
in these cases violates the right of free speech guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. But it has be-
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come equally well established that even peaceful picketing may be
enjoined by the states when it is for an unlawful purpose. Giboney
et al. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 69 S. Ct. 684, 93
L. Ed. 834 (1949); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802
et al. v. Wohl et al., 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178
(1942).
Cases in which injunctions were issued on this ground fall under
two headings: picketing to coerce violation of a statute, and picketing contrary to judicially declared public policy.
Under the first heading, picketing to coerce violation of a statute,
the leading case of Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra,
most aptly and forcefully illustrated the fact that even peaceful
picketing may be enjoined by the states if and when it is for an unlawful purpose. There, picketing was enjoined by the Missouri court
because its object was to induce the ice company to agree not to sell
ice to non-union peddlers. If the union had been successful, it would
have forced the company to violate the Missouri antitrust law.
In Phillips et al. v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners
of America et al., 362 Pa. 78, 66 A. (2d) 227 (1949), manufacturers
were picketed by the union because they refused to compel employees
to join the union but instead allowed the employees to decide for
themselves. The Pennsylvania court enjoined the picketing on the
ground tat it involved union coercion designed to induce a violation
of the state's anti-closed shop statute. Building Service Employees
International Union, Local 262 et al. v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 70
S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950), held that picketing to compel
an employer to control his employees' choice of bargaining representative was unlawful in that it was an attempt to induce a transgression of the state's policy against coercion of employees. This public
policy of the State of Washington had been declared by legislative
enactment. In Kold Kist, Inc. et al. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butchers Workmen of North America, Local No. 421 et al.. ....
Cal. App. (2d) .. , 221 P. (2d) 724 (1950), the plaintiff$ were in
the business of selling frozen food. The unions attempted to organize
the buyers of these foods in an effort to prevent sale of them after
certain hours. These activities were designed toward diminishing the
output of the frozen meats of the plaintiffs. California enjoined the
picketing because it encouraged a direct violation of an anti-monopoly
statute and also was contrary to public policy.
Under the second heading, peaceful picketing has been enjoined
by the states when it is contrary to judicially declared public policy.
"The fact that California's policy is expressed by the judicial organ
of the State rather than by the legislature we have repeatedly ruled
to be immaterial." Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of California, 339
U. S. 460, 466, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950). This same view
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is supported by International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local
309 et al. v. Hanke et al., 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995
(1950).
In the Hughes case, supra, the California court enjoined the picketing of a place of business for the purpose of securing submission to
a demand for employment of Negro clerks in proportion to the number of the business's Negro customers, contrary to a policy against
consideration of race in hiring practices. In International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, etc., Local 309, et al. v. Hanke et al., supra, there was
picketing of a self-employer's place of business for his refusal to
adopt a union shop. It was enjoined on grounds of public policy in
favor of self-employers.
These two cases also illustrate that the opinion of the state courts
on what is good labor policy will usually be respected by the present
United States Supreme Court. As stated in the Hughes case, supra,
339 U. S. at 467:
It is not for this Court to deny to a State the right, or even to question the desirability, of fitting its law "to a concrete situation through
the authority given .

.

. to its courts."

In the instant case, the Arkansas court, amplifying and extending
the rules laid down in the above two categories, held that picketing
for an indirect violation of a state statute may be enjoined. In arriving at this decision the court found it necessary to consider compositely, the contract clause picketed for, the union constitution, and
testimony of the union representatives.
The basic conflict lies in the right of labor organizations to picket
peacefully, which has been called an exercise of freedom of speech,
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, and the co-existing right of the state
to define and proscribe labor practices which are inimical to the general welfare, as construed by the state. The instant case properly
emphasizes that peaceful picketing for an unlawful purpose, however
indirect or covert that purpose may be, will not be tolerated. It must
be noted, however, that no other court has gone so far in correlating
the precise facts to find an "unlawful objective" so as to bring the
case within the operation of the Giboney rule.
Wallace F. Neyerlin

OIL AND GAS--CONSERVATION-CONSTIUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA'S COMPULSORY UNITIZATION AcT.-Palmer Oil Corp. et al. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co. et al.. .... Okla ..... , 231 P. (2d) 997 (1951).
Lessors, lessees, and certain royalty interest owners contested an order
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission providing for the unitized
operation of an oil and gas reservoir in Oklahoma. The order was
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made pursuant to the Oklahoma Unitization Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52,
§ 286 (Cum. Supp. 1949), authorizing the extraction of minerals from
any common source of supply of oil and gas as though it were covered
by a single lease. The purpose of the Act was to achieve a greater recovery of oil and gas, and to protect the correlative rights of the owners of interests in them. The contestants did not deny the power of the
legislature to place regulations upon oil and gas production to achieve
these ends, but they attacked as unconstitutional the methods provided
by the Act.
In order to understand the need for unitization a brief review of
attempts by the Oklahoma legislature to regulate oil and gas production is appropriate. Until 1933, laissez-faire ruled the oil fields under
the guise of the rule of capture. Robinson, Oklahoma, 1938-1948 in
CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS 373 (Murphy ed. 1948). An individual was allowed exclusive ownership of as much of these valuable natural resources as he was able to bring to the surface by wells located
on his land. The only recourse available to an adjoining landowner
seeking to prevent the withdrawal of oil underlying his land was to
drill an offset well adjacent to every well near his land. Hardwicke,
The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas,
13 TExAs L. REV. 391 (1935). The inevitable result was an oil boom
whenever oil was discovered in a locality. This hasty withdrawal of
oil caused a considerable amount of physical and economic waste.
Jacobs, Unit Operation of and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L. J. 1207 (1948).
Most of the gas brought to the surface was allowed to escape, leaving
the oil remaining underground economically inaccessible. Discovery
of any large reservoir also had a disastrous effect upon the market
price of oil. It was to prevent these evils that the Oklahoma Legislature began in 1933 to enact a series of statutes culminating in the
Unitization Act. Robinson, supra at 372.
The first measures employed to control the production of oil were
proration and gas-oil ratios. By virtue of a 1933 statute, the Corporation Commission was authorized to limit the production of oil from any
reservoir when full production would result in waste. OXLA. STAT. tit.
52, § 87 (1941). Each well was allotted a percentage share of the
maximum amount of oil that could be produced without waste from
the field. Since the gas pressure in the reservoir was not taken into
account in proration, the Corporation Commission also was given authority to establish gas-oil ratios to prevent unreasonable dissipation of
the reservoir energy. OimA. STAT. tit. 52, § 86 (1941).
Though partially effective, these measures fell short of achieving
maximum mineral recovery. In order to limit the number and provide
for the reasonable spacing of wells, the legislature next passed the Well
Spacing Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87 (1941), by which the Corporation Commission was authorized to establish well spacing and drilling
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units upon application of eighty percent of the lessees of any common
source of oil supply. Since the Commission could limit the number of
wells in a unit, the problem of prorating the oil produced naturally resulted. The problem as to landowners with royalty interests in the
unit was solved by the Act, which authorized the Commission to require them to share on an acreage basis one eighth of the oil produced.
The constitutionality of this provision was sustained in Patterson v.
Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. et al., 182 Okla. 155, 77 P. (2d) 83 (1938),
appeal dismissed, 305 U. S. 376, 59 S. Ct. 259, 83 L. Ed. 231 (1939).
The Act did not, however, operate to pool the lessee's interest in the
drilling unit. To a large extent the problem of dividing the expense
and the profits from the wells remained a matter requiring the agreement of the lessees of each unit. When an agreement was not forthcoming operation of the unit was retarded and lessors, lessees, and the
public suffered. Robinson, supra at 391.
The authority of the commission was deficient in other respects. For
maximum recovery the whole reservoir must be treated as though under one lease. Jacobs, supra at 1212. (Under the Well Spacing Act
the unit usually embraced only twenty or forty acre tracts.) By disregarding conflicting interests of the various lessees, wells can be placed
at the most favorable geological positions and their number limited to
the minimum required for adequate extraction from the reservoir; by
disregarding the division of land into separate leases the operator also
may make use of secondary recovery measures, such as waterflooding
or gas repressuring, as a means of salvaging oil otherwise unobtainable.
Jacobs, supra at 1210.
In 1945, the Oklahoma Legislature, in an attempt to protect the
correlative rights of landowners and to conserve the supply of oil,
passed the Compulsory Unitization Act, OIKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 286
(Cum. Supp. 1949). This statute authorized the Corporation Commission, on certain conditions, to consider the whole reservoir as a
single unit and apportion profits and expenses among the lessors and
lessees. Two provisions of this Act cast doubt upon its constitutionality. The first requires the petition of the lessees of fifty per cent or
more of the proposed unit area before the Corporation Commission has
authority to begin proceedings to determine whether unitization should
be effected. The second provides that within sixty days after entry
of the unitization order, the lessees of fifteen per cent of the unit may
invalidate it. It was argued that this Act constitutes an improper delegation of legislative power, and that it discriminates against lessors
in favor of lessees, contrary to the Equal Protection clause of the Federal Constitution, U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV, § 1, and to the Oklahoma
Constitution, OKLA. CONST. Art. V, § 51.
It is indisputable that the legislature may not constitutionally delegate its law-making authority. PanamaRefining Co. et al. v. Ryan et al.,
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293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 (1935). When an individual or non-official group is the recipient of the legislative power the
delegation is particularly obnoxious. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. et al.,
298 U. S. 238, 311, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936). However,
if the legislature itself conditions the application or rejection of the
legislation upon the consent of private persons the delegation has not
always been declared invalid. The Court struck down an act delegating
to property owners the power to establish a building line, Epubank v.
City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 33 S. Ct. 76, 57 L. Ed. 156 (1912);
held unconstitutional an act permitting property owners to forbid erection of a home for the aged poor, Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust
Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50, 73 L. Ed. 210 (1928); but
sustained an ordinance requiring the consent of property owners before
billboards could be erected in a residential district, Thomas Cusack Co.
v. Chicago et al., 242 U. S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 190, 61 L. Ed. 472 (1917).
In determining the constitutionality of these and similar acts the
courts have applied several tests. The primary one is whether the restriction is within the police power of the state. In Washington ex rel.
Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, supra, the Court stressed the fact
that there was no legislative finding that the erection of a home for the
aged poor would be contrary to public health or morals; therefore, it
was not within the police power to forbid its erection. However, in
Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago et al., supra, the Court approved the
delegation because it was convinced that the erection of billboards in
residential districts was an invitation to crime and immorality.
Another test is whether the statute itself imposes the restriction but
allows interested parties the right to reject it, or whether it permits
them to apply it initially. In Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago et al.,
supra, the Court used this criterion to distinguish that case from
Eubank v. City of Richmond, supra. The Court held that, unlike a
statute allowing interested parties to initially apply a restriction on the
use of property, a statute merely permitting property owners to remove
a restriction already imposed is not objectionable. Accord, Hampton
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624
(1928). In Currin et al. v. Wallace et al., 306 U. S. 1, 59 S. Ct. 379, 83
L. Ed. 441 (1939), the Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing the
Secretary of Agriculture to require inspection of tobacco in interstate
auction markets. Action by the Secretary was conditioned on approval
of two-thirds of the growers voting at a referendum. The Court reasoned that Congress had merely placed a proper restriction upon its own
regulation.
A new line of reasoning has appeared in recent decisions by the
Supreme Court. In United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative Inc.
et al., 307 U. S. 533, 59 S. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed. 1446 (1939), the Secretary of Agriculture was possessed of authority to establish minimum
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prices for milk sold to dealers upon approval of two-thirds of the producers affected. The Court sustained the consent provision on the
ground that Congress had authority to put the order into effect without approval of anyone, and could, therefore, condition the act upon
the consent of the group reasonably affected. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
et al. v. United States et al., 307 U. S. 588, 59 S. Ct. 1019, 83 L. Ed.
1478 (1939).
The Oklahoma Unitization Act does not enable lessees to impose
restrictions upon the use of property. It merely conditions restrictive
action by the Corporation Commission upon the petition of the lessees
of interests in fifty per cent of the common source of supply. After
petition there must be a finding by the Commission that a greater benefit will result to interested parties if the field is unitized. The provision permitting fifteen per cent of the lessees of a unitized field to veto
the unitization order seems unobjectionable in that it applies to the
removal rather than the imposition of a restriction. Finally, since the
parties admit that restriction of oil production to achieve conservation
is within the police power, it would satisfy the first test above--i.e., that
the regulation be within the scope of the police power.
Besides contesting the delegation of power, the lessors also argued
that the unitization act improperly discriminates against them, because both the provision that provides for petition to the Commission
to have the field unitized, and the provision that permits veto of the
unitization plan are restricted to action by the lessees. The court answered this objection by declaring, as the Supreme Court did in United
States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc. et al., supra, that since the
legislature had power to enact the legislation without consent of either
lessees or royalty owners, it was optional with it to require the consent
of either. The dissenting judges insisted, however, that the lessors
had a fixed and substantial interest in the oil being produced, and must
be given a voice in deciding whether there will be unitization.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit legislation merely
because it is limited either in the objects to which it is directed, or by
the territory in which it is to operate. It requires that persons similarly situated be treated alike under the circumstances and conditions,
both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed, Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 S. Ct. 350, 30 L. Ed. 578, (1887). In deciding which parties are similarly situated, the choice must not be
arbitrary. Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U. S. 618, 24 S. Ct.
784, 48 L. Ed. 1142 (1904). Taggart et al. v. Claypool, 145 Ind. 590,
44 N. E. 18 (1896), involved an ordinance which authorized the city
council to annex contiguous territory, but which also provided that
seventy-five per cent of the resident freeholders could prevent the annexation. The court argued that the distinction between resident and
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non-resident owners was valid, because their interest in the protection
and convenience afforded the area would differ. See Currin et al. v.
Wallace et al., supra.
The purpose of the Oklahoma Unitization Act is to obtain the greatest possible recovery from the reservoir and provide for distribution
to those entitled according to their proportionate interests in the common source. Because of their understanding of the problems involved
the lessees are in a better position than the royalty owners to appraise
the propriety of adopting unitization and to provide the evidence necessary for a unitization order. These factors together with the greater
accessibility of lessees make their selection a practical and reasonable
one.
Probably the court's most potent argument is that the lessors and
lessees of mineral rights in oil producing land have no legitimate adverse
interests. The profit of one varies directly with that of the other, and
the success of the lessee inures to the benefit of the lessor. In any event
the lessors are not precluded from opposing the unitization order, the
instant case standing as an example of the lessors' right to appeal from
the determination of the Corporation Commission.
It appears from this review of authority that the Oklahoma Unitization Act will withstand future attack on its constitutionality. It seems
to be a wise measure in view of the limited reserves of these important
natural resources, and the failure of less stringent legislative regulation
in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Legislature has produced a statute which,
barring a reversal in the Supreme Court, should be accepted as a model
for future oil conservation measures.
Lawrence S. May, Jr.

TORTS-PARENT

AND

CHILD-RIGHT

OF AN UNEMANCIPATED MINOR

TO SUE ITS PARENTS FOR PERSONAL INjmuREs.Mahnke v. Moore,
__ Md ..... , 77 A. (2d) 923 (1951). The plaintiff was the illegitimate
infant daughter of the defendant's decedent. The plaintiff's father
hideously shot and killed her mother in her presence. After the shootig the father kept the plaintiff with the dead body for six days, and
then committed suicide before her eyes. This action was brought in
tort against the estate of the father to recover for shock, mental anguish,
and permanent mental and physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
The question of the child's illegitimacy had no bearing on the decision;
the court treated the child as though she were legitimate. The court
held that an action for personal injuries could be maintained by a
minor against the parent, or as here, against the parent's estate.

RECENT DECISIONS
The problem presented is not a new one, although its legal history
is comparatively short. The first case deciding this point arose in 1891,
Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), in which a minor
brought action against her mother for false imprisonment for an
allegedly unwarranted commitment to an insane asylum. The court
decided against the child on the basis of public policy, laying down
the rule, 9 So. at 887:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy . . . forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent.

This rule has been followed by the majority of the decisions on point.
Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924); Miller v.
Pelzer et al., 159 Minn. 375, 199 N. W. 97 (1924); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763 (1908); Mannion v. Mannion,
3 N. J. Misc. 68, 129 Adt. 431 (1925); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y.
425, 40 N. E. (2d) 236 (1942); Small v Morrison et al., 185 N. C.
577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923); Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S. E.
750 (1931). McKelvy v. McKelvy et al., 111 Tenn. 338, 77 S. W.
664 (1904), declared that the Hewellette case exemplified the common
law rule, and that the child's only protection from personal invasions
by his parent was the criminal law of the state.
The most extreme application of the Hewellette rule was made in
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), where a father
was convicted of raping his' fifteen year old daughter. The child
brought a civil action for damages against him and received a favorable verdict in the lower court. On appeal the judgment was reversed,
the court adhering to the parental immunity doctrine on the basis of
"domestic tranquillity." It is regrettable that the parental immunity
rule was extended so far. The court, apparently attempting to justify
its stand, rationalized that there was no practical line of demarcation
which could be drawn, ". . . for the same principle which would allow
the action in the case of a heinous crime . . . would allow an action

to be brought for any other tort." 79 Pac. at 789. Commenting on
this case Professor Harper said, "To deny a recovery in damages to
a daughter against a father who has been convicted of raping her on
the ground that it would tend to disturb the beauty, tranquillity, and
sanctity of that home is nothing short of absurdity." HARmR, TORTS
§ 285 (1933).
The theory that an action brought by a child against its parent for
a tort would be barred at common law is to be doubted. Many of the
early text writers agreed that an action of this kind would be allowed.
See, e.g., Reeve who says, in discussing the father's privilege of chastising his child, that a parent might administer such severe punishment as to make him liable to the child in an action for a battery;
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the parent should be excused "For error of opinion ... but for malice
of heart, he must not be shielded from the just claims of the child."
REEvE, DoMEsTIc RELATIONS 420 (3d ed. 1874).
The early cases contribute little toward solving the problem. In
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 113 (1859), where an action of trespass for
assault and battery was brought by a pupil against a schoolmaster
standing in loco parentis, the court intimated that a parent might be
answerable for malice or wicked motives in punishing a child. See also
Bird v. Black et al., 5 La. Ann. 189 (1850); Fitzgerald v. Nortkcote
et al., 4 F. & F. 656, 176 Eng. Rep. 734 (1865). The early common
law did, however, recognize that a child had property rights against
its parents. Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859). It could be logically
assumed that if an action arising out of an interference with property
rights were permitted, actions arising out of personal invasions would
likewise be allowed, but there is no authority to sustain this position.
In the more modern cases opposition to the doctrine of parental
immunity was first voiced in situations where the defendant stood in
a position of loco parentis to the injured child. In Dix v. Martin, 171
Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913), the defendant standing in the
relation of loco parentis severely beat the child. In answer to the defendant's argument that the action could not be maintained because
of the existence of the parent-child rlationship, the court replied that
even if that relationship did exist, the defendant still should be answerable for the injuries resulting from the assault. Accord, Clasen v. Pruhs,
69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903). Further opposition has been recorded in dissenting opinions. The dissenting judge in Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 788-9 (1927), argued that it was illogical to deny a child an action against its parents for the loss of a leg
or other personal injuries, when the courts permit the child to bring
an action for damages for the parents' negligent management of the
child's property. He said, 212 N. W. at 789: "The reason that justifies
the one and denies the other is metaphysical and not founded in justice.
It exalts property above physical condition to enjoy property." See
also Small v. Morrison, supra (dissenting opinion). In both these cases,
however, the majority affirmed the Hewellette doctrine.
One of the first cases which allowed the action where the defendant
was a natural parent and not merely in the position of loco parentis,
was Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 AUt. 905 (1930). There,
a minor child was injured in the collapse of a staging, the result of
the negligence of his parent-employer. The parent carried employers'
liability insurance. The court held that the relationship of the parties
at the time of the injury was not that of parent and child, but of
master and servant. The right of a parent to reasonably discipline
his child was recognized and affirmed, but it was stated that this im-
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munity should not be extended to acts clearly outside the parental relationship. It was further said, 150 AtI. at 906:
There never has been a common-law rule that a child could not sue
its parent. It is a misapprehension of the situation to start with that idea
and to treat the suits which -have been allowed as exceptions to a general rule.

It is interesting to note that in the last three cases cited insurance
companies were involved. The explanation of the tendency to permit
the action in these cases seems to be that the real reason for the parental immunity rule is gone: the insurance company and not the
parent is the real party in interest, the parent being only a nominal
defendant. This point is illustrated in Lusk v. Lusk et al., 113 W. Va.
17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932), where an action for damages was instituted
by a minor daughter against her father and -the school board for personal injuries sustained by her due to the alleged negligent operation
of a school bus by her father. The court, granting recovery, pointed
out that the judgment against the father would be absorbed by the
insurance company, 166 S. E. at 539:
There is no reason for applying the rule in the instant case. This
action is not unfriendly as between the daughter and the father. A recovery by her is no loss to him. In fact, their interests unite in favor
of her recovery, but without hint of "domestic fraud and collusion." . . .
There is no filial recrimination and no pitting of the daughter against
the father in this case. No strained family relations will follow. On
the contrary, the daughter must honor the father for attempting to provide compensation against her misfortune. Family harmony is assured
instead of disrupted. A wrong is righted instead of "privileged."
When no need exists for parental immunity, the courts should not
extend it as a mere gratuity.

A recent case which allowed recovery by a minor child against the
parent is Cowgill v. Boock, .
Ore ..... 218 P. (2d) 445 (1950). A
minor son was killed through the negligence of his father, and an
action was brought by the administrator of the son's estate against
the administrator of the father's estate. The issue was whether the
decedent minor, if he had lived, could have brought this action against
his father. The court treated the action as if the father and son were
living and decided that the child's administrator should recover. The
court carefully reviewed the authorities, concluding that the only reason
given for denying the action was that it subserved public policy. The
court maintained that the general rule should be modified to allow
an unemancipated minor to maintain an action for damages against
its parents for willful or malicious personal torts since'the peace,
security and tranquillity of the home had already been disrupted by
the father's acts, and recovery certainly does not violate public policy.
The court in the principal case conceded that parental authority
should be maintained and that a child should not be allowed to re-
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cover damages if the recovery would impair discipline or destroy the
harmony of the family; but if the parent is guilty of acts that demonstrate a disregard of the normal parental relation, he should not be
immune from suit by the child.
The necessity of the parental immunity rule is apparent. Without
it a minor could bring an action for every real or imagined hurt, large
or small, suffered at the hands of the parent. However, this rule
should be tempered to allow recovery in situations similar to the instant case. The courts in both Cowgill v. Boock, supra, and the principal case, though still in the minority, have done much to bring about
this desirable modification. As stated in Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra,
150 Atl. at 910:
The law does not make fetishes of ideas. It limits them to their
proper spheres. And so this concept of family life ought not to be used
as a cloak for intended wrongs.

Richard F. Welter

ToRTs-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE IN
ACTIONS.-Bennett v. Los Angeles Tumor Institute et
al.. .... Cal. App. (2d) ... , 227 P. (2d) 473 (1951). The plaintiff
MALPRACTICE

brought an action for malpractice for X-ray burns. The alleged injuries consisted of blistering and peeling of the skin, and exudation of
fluids as these symptoms are usually found in burns. The plaintiff
failed to introduce expert testimony on the nature of the injuries,
relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court entered
a non-suit which was affirmed by the appellate court, in the instant
case, which held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply
where a layman is unable to say as a matter of common knowledge
and observation that the consequences of professional treatment were
not such as ordinarily would have followed if due care had been exercised.
Generally, a physician is liable to his patient for a failure to exercise an ordinary and reasonable degree of skill which is generally
possessed by others of his profession in the same locality. Engelking
v. Carlson et al., 13 Cal. (2d) 216, 88 P. (2d) 695 (1939); Hesler v.
California Hospital Co. et al., 178 Cal. 764, 174 Pac. 654 (1918).
This means the minimum skill common to the profession and reasonable care in exercising it. The presumption is that the physician used
reasonable care and skillfully treated his patient. Donahoo v. Lovas,
105 Cal. App. 705, 288 Pac. 698 (1930). The plaintiff must produce
affirmative evidence that the defendant was unskillful or negligent and
show the causal connection between the injury and the want of care.
What constitutes proper and usual care in diagnosis and treatment
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is a question for experts and can be established only by their expert
testimony. Moore v. Belt et al., 34 Cal. (2d) 525, 212 P. (2d) 509
(1950); Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437, 181 Pac. 642 (1919).
There is, however, a well recognized class of cases where there is
obviously a definite want of due care and skill constituting grounds
for an inference of negligence. The thing speaks for itself: the facts
of the occurrence warrant the inference that the result is due to
negligence without the aid of an expert voice. In these situations,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is clearly applicable in malpractice
actions. Waddle v. Sutherland, 156 Miss. 540, 126 So. 201 (1930).
In malpractice cases the instrumentality that causes the injury must
be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the result must
be of a nature that a layman could conclude from common knowledge
that these consequences ordinarily do not occur without negligence or
lack of skill. Engelking v. Carlson, supra; Pendergraft v. Royster,
203 N. C. 384, 166 S. E. 285 (1932). The inference based on common
knowledge is the basis for res ipsa loquitur. Where scientific opinion
is not required to throw light on the subject the doctrine is applicable.
But, if expert evidence is required to show not only what was done,
but how and why it occurred, then the question is outside the realm
of the testimony of laymen, and the doctrine will not apply. SHAIN,
RES IPSA LOQUITU R 469-70 (1945), states the rule:
. . . res ipsa loquitur applies where, during the performance of surgical
or other skilled operations, an ulterior act or omission occurs, the judgment of which does not require scientific opinion to throw light upon
the subject, while it would not apply in cases involving the merits of
diagnosis and scientific treatment.

Many decisions that state that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable
in malpractice cases, disclose upon closer examination that they refer
to instances where there occurs an unfavorable result or unsuccessful
treatment for which the physician cannot be held an insurer. Ingram
v. Harris, 244 Ala. 246, 13 So. (2d) 48 (1943); Stacy et al. v. Williams, 253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. (2d) 697 (1934); Inglis v. Morton, 99
Wash. 570, 169 Pac. 962 (1918). A physician does not undertake to
insure a cure or guarantee results. The following statement in Ewing
et al. v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442, 443 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1897), is often
quoted to emphasize this point:
If the maxim, "Res ipsa loquitur," were applicable . . . and a failure to cure were -held to he evidence, however slight, of negligence on
the part of the physician or surgeon causing the bad result, few would
be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would have
to assume financial liability for nearly all the "ills that flesh is heir to."

Examples of situations where the common knowledge and experience
of a layman can conclude negligence without the necessity of expert
opinion are operations where a sound part of the body is removed
instead of the diseased part, Thomsen v. Burgeson, 26 Cal. App. (2d)
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235, 79 P. (2d) 136 (1938); a failure to remove a surgical sponge
after an operation, Armstrong et ux. v. Wallace et ux., 8 Cal. App.
(2d) 429, 47 P. (2d) 740 (1935); burns caused by hot compresses
or water bottles, Timbrell et ux. v. Suburban Hospital Inc. et al., 4 Cal.
(2d) 68,47 P. (2d) 737 (1935).
Where the injury complained of has resulted from an X-ray burn,
application of the doctrine becomes particularly difficult because the
ordinary aftereffects of the treatment are often indistinguishable from
an actually harmful destruction of tissue. For this reason, a rule of
degree rather than of kind should be adopted. In Johnson v. Marshall,
241 Ill. App. 80 (1926), the plaintiff suffered severe burns about the
face and eyes when X-ray was employed in a course of treatment. The
doctrine was held to apply, the severity and extent of the burn serving
to distinguish that decision from the principal case. But in Nixon et
ux. v. Pfahler, 279 Pa. 377, 124 Atl. 130 (1924), where the plaintiff
was struck on the knee by a spark from the machine while having her
teeth X-rayed, the doctrine was rejected. The court held that, because
the medical profession must occasionally employ dangerous agencies,
to attach a presumption of negligence to their use would make the
doctor an insurer of his patient.
If it is reasonably probable that the injury may be the result of
any one cf several causes, the doctrine generally will not apply. LaPorte v. Houston et al., 33 Cal. (2d) 167, 199 P. (2d) 665 (1948);
Smith v. McClung, 201 N. C. 648, 161 S. E. 91 (1931). This rule
was followed in Antowell v. Friedman, 197 App. Div. 230, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 777 (2d Dep't 1921), when the evidence showed that it was
just as probable that the burn resulted from hypersensitivity as from
negligence. But in Waddle v. Sutherland supra, the court held that
hypersensitivity can always be detected by reasonable care and skill before third degree burns occur. Similarly, when the patient was burned
after 161 X-ray treatments, application of res ipsa loquitur was allowed
because it was plain that the burns could not be attributed to hypersensitivity. Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 7 S. W. (2d) 808 (1928).
In holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable only
in a restricted class of malpractice actions, the court in the principal
case has illustrated the prevalent reluctance to extend the doctrine.
The inference of negligence merely from the fact of unsatisfactory
results of medical treatment must be nearly exclusive of any other
inference before hypothecation of the rule in a given case will be permitted. In view of the fact that a layman's knowledge of the nature
of results from medical treatment by technical devices is at best fragmentary, this rule is both reasonable and necessary.

Martin I. Rodgers

RECENT DECISIONS
WILLS-JOINT WILL-EXECUTION OF A JOINT WILL AS EVIDENCE

WiLL..-Jacoby v. Jacoby
et al.. ....
Ill. App. .....
, 96 N. E. (2d) 362 (1950).
Defendant, Laura
Jacoby, and her husband executed a joint and mutual will which was
ordered prepared by the husband in anticipation of a journey, to provide for their children in the event the testators died in a common disaster.* By its provisions the survivor was to take the entire estate, but
if the common disaster occurred, the estate was to be held in trust for
the children. It was clearly shown that the will was prepared on short
notice and that the defendant had little knowledge of its contents other
than that it was a will. The husband died after the family returned
from the trip and the defendant had the will probated. Some years
after the death of the husband, the defendant made another will reducing the legacy to her son, the plaintiff, because of his flagrant misconduct. Plaintiff brought a bill in equity to restrain his mother from
revoking the joint will and to have the court declare that it had been
executed pursuant to a contract between the testators, and therefore
was irrevocable. The bill was dismissed for want of equity and plaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in the instant
case, holding that neither the provisions of the will itself, nor the facts
and surrounding circumstances, constituted clear and convincing evidence that the will was executed pursuant to a contract. The will was
therefore found to be revocable.
The decision follows the general rule in the United States that a
joint and mutual will-one that is reciprocal in its terms, contained in
OF AN IRREVOCABLE CONTRACT TO MAKE A

one instrument and signed by two or more testators, ATKINSON, WILLS

§ 69 (1937); RoLLISON, WILLS § 183 (1939)-is insufficient of itself
to establish a contract between the parties. In Rolls et al. v. Allen et al.,
204 Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450, 452 (1928), the court said ".

.

. presump-

tions will not and should not, in such cases, take the place of proof."
In Hays et al. v. Jones et al., 122 Fla. 67, 164 So. 841, 845 (1935), the
court held that in construing a joint and mutual will, "no express or
necessarily implied promise is involved." It is significant that this
case involved a will which only gave a life estate to the survivor with
remainder over, and not an absolute disposition.
On the other hand, it was stated in Frazier et al. v. Patterson et al.,
243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216, 218 (1909), that mere execution of a joint
will left no other presumption than that there must have been "... some

previous understanding or agreement between the parties." This statement was criticized by the courts in the instant case, 96 N. E. (2d) at
367, and in Menke v. Duwe et al., 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924),
where a joint will was signed by the wife who thinking it was necessary
to validate her husband's will, was unaware that it was her own will
as well.
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Mere execution of a joint reciprocal will is not sufficient to establish a contract, Tutunfian et al. v. Vetzigian et al., 299 N. Y. 315, 87
N. E. (2d) 275 (1949), nor is it sufficient evidence in itself, without
reference to its terms, of a contract, In re Rhodes' Estate, 277 Pa. 450,
121 At. 327 (1923), nor does it create a presumption of a contract,
Curtis et al. v. Aycock et al., 179 S. W. (2d) 843 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944). In order to establish a contract consideration must be shown.
Buchanan et al. v. Anderson et al., 70 S. Ct. 454, 50 S. E. 12 (1905).
See also Ginn et al. v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696 (1917).
The courts are much more apt to construe a contract from the existence of a joint and mutual will if the testators, as husband and wife,
devise a life estate to the survivor with remainder over to designated
beneficiaries. A majority of courts hold or state in dicta, that in order
to promote equity, such a testamentary disposition evidences an intent
to be bound by a contract, which cannot be revoked by the survivor
especially if he has taken the benefits under the will. See In re Adkins'
Estate, 161 Kan. 239, 167 P. (2d) 618 (1946). Contra, Hays et al.
v. Jones et al., supra. In Lewis et al. v. Lewis, 104 Kan. 269, 178 Pac.
421 (1919), the surviving testator of a reciprocal joint will remarried,
and after his death his second wife sought to have the will set aside.
The court held that an intent to contract was deducible from the will
itself, and that it could not be declared invalid. In Brown et al. v.
Brown e., al., 53 N. M. 379, 208 P. (2d) 1081 (1949), the surviving
wife had taken the benefits under a will, which was twice what she
otherwise would have received as her statutory portion of her husband's
estate. She was not allowed to revoke the will. The same result was
reached in Nye et al. v. Bradford, 144 Tex. 618, 193 S. W. (2d) 165
(1946), and approved in dicta in Puckett et al. v. Hatcher et al., 307
Ky. 160, 209 S. W. (2d) 742, 744 (1948). To be distinguished are
those cases in which the court found that a contract was evident from
the terms of the will. See e.g., Watkins et al. v. Covington Trust and
Banking Co. et al., 303 Ky. 644, 198 S. W. 964 (1947).
It must be recalled that not all courts hold the execution of a joint
and mutual will devising a life estate to the surviving spouse as of itself
sufficient to raise a contract. See e.g., Hays et al. v. Jones et al., supra.
The decisions which refuse to so hold can be partially resolved, as suggested by Justice Smith of the Supreme Court of Kansas, if one remembers that the question of whether there is a contract is strictly a
matter of proof. The existance or non-existance of a contract should
be determined by the courts with the view that proof of a contract and
proof of a will are entirely different matters. Smith, Joint and Mutual
Wills, 20 KAN. JUD. COUNcIL BuLL. 3 (1946). The assertion of dogmatic rules was criticized by Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills: Mutual
Promises to Devise as a Means of Conveyancing, 15 CoRNELL L. Q.
358, 361 (1930), where he points out that while the form of the will
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may have some evidentiary value, the courts should continue to give
effect to the intention of the parties by considering all of the evidence;
unfortunately, however, ". . . the result of the individual case is too
commonly summarized as a dogmatic rule based entirely upon the form
of the wills." This is substantially in accord with the views of Justice
Smith, as he concludes that mere form should not be controlling: proof
of the contract should be shown by the intent of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances, with each case standing on its own facts.
The efforts of the courts to determine, in an equitable fashion, the
efficacy of a joint will as evidence of a contract give ample warning
against any attempt to set fixed rules based merely on the form of the
instrument. This would be an injustice to the testators when it is
doubtful that they had any intention to bind each other. As the court
in the instant case clearly pointed out, this is especially true where the
mutual disposition is absolute, and there is no evidence other than the
fact of the joint and reciprocal will of an intent to bind the survivor.
Anthony V. Amodio

WILLS-REvOCATION-ADmISSIBILITY

OF

TESTATOR'S DEcLA

TIoNs

ANniUs REVOCANDi.-Fletcher Trust Co. et al. v. Morse, -_ Ind .....
97 N. E. (2d)
154 (1951). Cheston L. Heath executed his will designating the appellee Morse as a beneficiary. The testator's will was found after his
death with heavy lines drawn through the name Morse, with a statement attached to the will specifically excluding him from any benefits
under it. This action is for a declaratory judgment to determine the
appellee's status under the will. At trial undisputed evidence was
offered to show that the appellee's name had been crossed out some
time after the execution of the will. However, no evidence was tendered as to who performed the act of obliteration, and no direct evidence was introduced to determine who had the custody of the will
from the time of its execution until it was found. In the instant case,
it was decided that the bequest to the appellee had been effectively
revoked.
The fundamental issues confronting the court were whether the
attempted revocation was actually an alteration, and thus a nullity;
and whether declarations, not a part of the res gestae, are admissible
as evidence of the testator's revocatory intent.
The revocation of a will is generally controlled by statute. Many
statutes declare that no will in writing can be revoked in whole or
in part except by the express means provided by the statute. See, e.g.,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-301 (Bums 1933). These statutes are uniformly
construed to grant the power to partially revoke a duly executed will.
OTHER THAN A PART OF THE

RIs GESTAE

TO PROvE
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McPherson v. Clark, 3 Bradf. 92 (N. Y. Surr. 1854); Eschbach v.
Collins, 61 Md. 478 (1884) (". . . or any clause. .. ,").
Although statutes authorize the partial revocation of a will they
cannot be construed to permit an alteration-the two words are not
synonymous. Eschbach v. Collins, supra. "To revoke a testamentary
disposition is to annul it, so that, in legal contemplation, it ceases to
exist, and becomes as inoperative as if it had never been written."
Eschbach v. Collins, supra, 61 Md. at 499. However, when words are
changed or added, the will is altered and a new testamentary disposition is made. Gardiner v. Gardiner et al., 65 N. H. 230, 19 Atl. 651
(1890). When the testator alters his will but does not, in the manner
prescribed by statute, authenticate the alteration, the will " . . . stands
in legal force, the same as it did before, so far as it is legible after the
attempted alteration." Wolf v. Bollinger, 62 fI1. 368, 374 (1872).
The increase in a beneficiary's interest resulting from a partial
revocation is not an alteration or new bequest. A contrary rule would,
by restricting and destroying their effect, render statutes authorizing
partial revocation inoperative. Swinton v. Bailey, 4 App. Cas. 70
(1879). "The increase of the residuary estate which may result from
• . . [partial revocation] is not a new testamentary disposition, but
a mere incidental consequence resulting from the exercise of the power
conferred on the testator by ... statute." Brown et al. v. Brown et al.,
91 S. C. 101, 74 S E. 135, 136 (1912). In the principal case, the
increase in the residuary legatee's estate was not a new testamentary
gift but a "mere incidental consequence" of the exercise of the testator's
power to revoke.
When a will, known to have been in the actual or constructive
possession of the testator until his death, is missing or is found in
a condition which meets the physical requirements for revocation, it
is inferable that whatever has happened to the will is the result of the
testator's actions. In fact, a legal presumption arises that the testator
has performed the acts animus revocandi, In re Kennedy's Will, 167
N. Y. 163, 60 N. E. 442 (1901). The need for proof of a testator's
intent most often appears when a party seeks to rebut that presumption. The question then arises whether the declarations of the testator, not a part of the res gestae, are admissible as evidence of the
testator's state of mind, i.e., intent, at the time the act was performed.
The hearsay evidence rule prohibits the testimonial recital of the
unsworn oral or written declarations of a person not available for
cross-examination. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1360 et seq. (3d ed.
1940). However, according to the weight of authority, a testator's
oral or written declarations are admissible to prove intent, without
regard to the time at which they were made. E.g., In re Bond's Estate,
Williams et al. v. Presbytery of Portland et al., 172 Ore. 509, 143 P.
(2d) 244 (1943).

RECENT DECISIONS
Declarations alone are insufficient to establish a revocation, but
when evidence drawn from physical facts raises the issue of revocation, there is no apparent reason for refusing to admit declarations of
an intent to revoke. Stuart et al. v. McWhorter et al., 238 Ky. 82, 36
S. W. (2d) 842 (1931). In Harringet al. v. Allen, 25 Mich. 505, 507
(1872), the court stated:
It is not pretended that any expressions of the kind in question could
be used to establish specific facts embraced by the expressions. The point
to which the evidence is referred, is the state and bearing of the testators
mind, whether favorable or unfavorable, to,the will.

For example, a declaration of affections is "proper evidence" of the
testator's feelings at the time it is made. That fact is the basis for
the inference that he had that feeling for a period of time prior to
the making of the statement. Appeal of Spencer, 77 Conn. 638, 60 AtI.
289 (1905).
An analysis of the cases admitting the declarations of a testator
reveals that they are of two classes. In the first, the statements are
admitted on the grounds of necessity and trustworthiness. According
to Wigmore, these are the basic reasons underlying all exceptions to
the hearsay rule. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
Typifying the cases of this class is Stuart et al. v. McWhorter et al.,
supra, in which the court stated that justice and truth demanded the
admission of a testator's declarations of intent. In In re Skelton's Will,
143 N. C. 218, 55 S. E. 705 (1906), it was argued that because the
knowledge of a testator is peculiar to him, and he has no reason to
falsify his statements, his declarations should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
In the decisions of the second class, the hearsay rule is simply
ignored, and, with no reason given, the evidence admitted. "It is clear
.. . that this court has always assumed that such declarations were
admissible." Burton v. Wylde et al., 261 Ill. 397, 103 N. E. 976, 978
(1913). A reading of the cases in this group does not clearly disclose
whether the judges consider such declarations circumstantial evidence;
rather than hearsay testimony, and thus not subject to the rule;
whether they consider them to be exempted or excepted testimony;
or whether they actually accept the declarations for reasons similar to
those relied upon by the decisions in the first class.
Once the declarations have been admitted, their force "...
to
prove the attitude and condition of the testator's mind, will, of course,
depend upon an endless variety of circumstances, and in each case the
good sense of the jury must ascertain it, and decide."- Harring et al.
v. Allen, supra, 25 Mich. at 508. It is immaterial that the declarations
might possibly be made in jest since the weight to be given them is
for the jury to determine. Patterson et al. v. Hickey, 32 Ga. 156
(1861). To decide the truth or falsity of the testator's statements is
the duty of the jury. Collagan v. Burns, 57 Me. 449 (1867).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In the few jurisdictions, including New York, Colorado, Vermont,
and Kansas, which constitute the minority, the hearsay rule is more
stringently applied and the courts employ reasoning similar to that of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Throckmorton v. Holt et al.,
180 U. S. 552, 21 S. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663 (1901). There it was
held that declarations not a part of the res gestae were inadmissable,
except for those declarations which involuntarily mirror the testator's
mental capacity. The Court stated, 180 U. S. at 576:
... the only possible importance of such [prior or subsequent] declarations rests in the claim that they are true, and an inference is sought
to be drawn which is founded wholly upon the assumption of their truth.
Now if their only value rest upon that assumption, then the fact
that they are unsworn declarations brings them at once within the bar
of the general rule of evidence that unsworn declarations are not admissible.

Under the minority rule the declaration of a testator, not offered to
prove capacity, will be received only through the res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule. In re Glass' Estate, 14 Colo. App. 377, 60 Pac.
186 (1900); Caeman et al. v. Van Harke et al., 33 Kan. 333, 6 Pac. 620
(1885); In re Kennedy's Will, supra; In re Pardy'sEstate, 161 Misc.
77, 291 N. Y. Supp. 969 (Surr. 1936); In re Campbell's Will, 102 Vt.
294, 147 At. 687 (1929).

In the principal case, the condition of the will-heavy lines having
been drawn through the appellee's name-and the fact that the testator had, at least, partial possession of the document were held, by
the court, to raise a prima facie presumption of revocation. In conformity with the weight of authority, the court correctly decided that
the declarations of a testator were admissible, regardless of the time
at which they were made, to prove revocatory intent and thus support
the presumption. A doubt, concerning the importance of that ruling
to the decision in this case, is created by the court's comment that
because the evidence had not been objected to in the lower court, the
issue of admissibility was not properly before it. The statements of
the court furnish no definite basis for determining the decisiveness assigned to this technical point. Whether it is a mere supplemental
reason, or is itself sufficient for the holding, is not apparent.
The instant case is evidence of the fact that a majority of the
courts are satisfied with the present status of the law which allows the
admission of statements of the testator that show animus revocandi,
regardless of whether or not the statements are a part of the res gestae.
It is submitted that a clarification of the reasons why the courts permit this evidence to be introduced should be forthcoming.

Robert F. McCoy

